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Reagan Redux: Civil Rights Under Bush 
Neal Devins• 
I. INTRODUCTION 
What can Presidents do? A recent spate of books and articles 
suggest that Presidents should not simply manage ·the administra-
tive state but should forcefully advance a vision of governmental 
authority and policy. Former Reagan Administration officials Doug-
las Kmiec and Terry Eastland, for example, speak of presidential 
power as being "best defined by the strength of presidential will"1 
and assert that a great President '\vill definitely risk his political 
future . . . [and] is not one that hoards popularity for the sake of 
reelection. "2 This perception, that Presidep.ts must lead, is shared 
by liberals and conservatives alike. 
"The vision thing," according to the now popular wisdom, 
.explains the downfall of former-President George Bush. Instead of 
someone who embraced a notion of good government, Bush has 
been described as "amiable and aimless,"' ·"'less interested in do-
ing anything special as president than in just being president,'»4 a 
man who "often talks not about his convictions on difficult issues, 
but about how he wants to be 'positioned. '"5 For this reason, 
Bush was unceremoniously savaged by all sides. He was accused of 
being "a wimp" by Newsweek;6 "pretty, petulant, and 
unpresidential" by Time correspondents Michael Duffy and Dan 
Goodgame;7 and of "undermin[ing] his own popularity" by Wash-
* Professor of Law, Lecturer in Government, College of William and Mary. Thanks 
to Phil Runkel for exceptional research assistance on the 1991 Civil Rights Act and to 
Jan Thomas and Scott Zimmerman for valuable seminar papers on the 1990 Civil Rights 
AcL I am also indebted to Nelson Lund for his piercing commentary on an earlier draft 
of the Article. All mistakes are my own. 
1 DOUGLt\S W. KMIE9, THE ATIORNE.Y GENERAL'S LAWYER 47 (1992). 
2 TERRY EAsn.AND, ENERGY IN TilE ExECUllVE 306 (1992). 
3 MICHAEL DUFFY & DAN GoODGAME, MARCHING IN PlACE (1992). 
4 Jonathan Yardley, The Amiable Mister Bush, WASH. Posr, Aug. 9, 1992, at BW3 
(book review quoting Duffy and Goodgame). 
5 DUFFY & GoODGAME, sitpm note 3, at 89. 
6 Id. at 38. 
7 Robert]. Samuelson, The New N.xon, WASH. Posr, Aug. 5, 1992, at A23. 
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ington Post columnist Robert Samuelson.8 If anything, the 
President's harshest criticisms came from the right. George Will 
called Bush a "lap dog;,g Irving Kristol warned that "[i]deological 
conservatives are simply tired of winning Presidential elections 
while remaining powerless to shape the future;"10 and Wall Street 
Journal editor Robert Bartley described Bush as the antithesis of an 
agent of change.U In an obituary to Bush's presidency, Republi-
can speechwriter Peggy Noonan put it this way: "Serious people in 
public life stand for things and fight for them; the ensuing strug-
gle is meant to yield progress and improvement. Mr. Bush seemed 
embarrassed to believe. It left those who felt sympathy for him 
embarrassed to support him. "12 
The civil rights area, particularly Bush's signing of the 1991 
Civil Rights Act, is often singled out as a prime example of Bush's 
inability to lead. His posturing on the Act has been labelled the 
"biggest straddle" of his presidency, prompting the Washington Post, 
New Yom Times, and Time magazine to undertake news analyses of 
White House disarray.13 Conservatives and Republicans also 
joined this chorus. Clint Bolick thought Bush "bereft of a true 
moral compass on civil rights;"14 Chester E. Finn, Jr. spoke of the 
absence of "vigorous, principled leadership on this increasingly 
bitter front;"15 and Eddie Mahe spoke of the necessity of the 
White House to "stop the hemorrhaging with this ~isarray, this 
lack of planning, this lack of thought, this lack of vision, this lack 
of coherency. "16 Civil rights leaders, such as William Coleman 
and Vemon Jordan, also saw the 1991 Act as a "flat out repudia-
tion of the administration's longstanding position. "17 
8 Id. 
9 Paul Bennan, Sound and Fury: The Washington Punditocrru;y and the CoUapse of Ameri-
can Politics, NEW REPUBuc, Nov. 23, 1992, at 48 (quoting George Will) . 
10 liVing Kristol, The Slate of Disunion, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1991, at D17. 
11 Robert Bartley, Mugwumps Balik ~Nothings fur GOP's Future, WALL Sr. J., Feb. 
13, 1992, at A18. 
12 Peggy Noonan, Why Bush Failed, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1992, at A35. 
13 See Maureen D_owd, Whik House Isolation, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1991, at AI; Dan 
Goodgame, The Whik House: Nervous and Nasty, TIME, Dec. 2, 1991, at 18; Ruth Marcus, 
What Does Bush &aUy Believe1: Civil Rights Issue IUustrates Shifts, WASH. PoST, Aug. 18, 1992, 
at AI. 
14 See Marcus, supra note 13, at AI. 
15 Chester E. Finn, Jr., Q;wtas and the Bush Administration, COMMENTARY, Nov. 1991, 
at 17, 23. 
16 See Dowd, supra note 13, at AI. 
17 William T. Coleman, Jr. & Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., How the Civil Rights BiU was &. 
ally Passed, WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 1991, at A2l. 
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This portrayal of the Bush presidency as unfocused, rudder-
less, and reactive is persuasive. The invocation of the 1991 Civil 
Rights Act as exemplary of Bush's failings, however, goes too far. 
Although hardly bereft of the occasional flip-flop or policy indirec-
tion, the President stood more firmly on the 1991 Act than on 
any other civil rights matter. On the question of employment dis-
crimination lawsuits grounded in numerical imbalance (disparate 
impact), for example, the White House withstood several opportu-
nities to capitulate before compromising its position in the face of 
a possible veto override. 
Why then is the President's signing of the 1991 Act typically 
vi~wed as an outright policy reversal? The answer is that Bush's 
obvious lack of policy preferences on civil rights created a culture 
of failed presidential leadership. In other words, by persistently 
refusing to play a leadership role on civil rights, Bush's steadfast-
ness on the 1991 Act did not fit a pattem and was readily dis-
missed. Along these lines, the concessions that the White House 
won from congressional leaders are at once significant and easily 
ignored. 
This Article will recast Bush's role in the shaping of the 1991 
Act. However, it will not defend Bush's effectiveness as a civil 
rights policymaker, a role in which he demonstrated little leader-
ship. He provided no direction himself, nor did his appointees 
speak in a single voice. Civil rights policymaking was instead dis-
cordant and often self-contradictory. Rather than be engulfed in · 
the civil rights fires which consumed much of the Reagan adminis-
tration, Bush settled on a distinctively nonideological approach 
toward civil rights. His civil rights strategy was consistently reactive 
and utilitarian. The White House never played a leading role in 
initiating civil rights reform; when forced to act, it sought either 
to maximize political advantage or to minimize political loss. That 
this cost-benefit analysis often led to erratic policymaking was a 
price the Bush administration clearly was willing to pay. 
The failed leadership of the Bush White House is hardly a 
plea for a retum to the leadership styles of supposedly ideological-
ly pure visionaries such as Ronald Reagan. The Reagan administra-
tion also floundered in its efforts to reshape civil rights dialogue. 
Indeed, the Bush White House was correct in seeking to avoid 
some of the pitfalls which beset its predecessor. ·Bush, however, 
leamed the wrong lessons from Reagan. Rather than sorting out · 
how a President could advance his agenda in the face of an unre-
958 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:955 
ceptive Congress, Bush simply abandoned civil rights as an issue 
that mattered to his presidency. 
This Article will examine the nexus between and the lessons 
to be learned from Reagan and Bush approaches to civil rights. 
Part II will assess the Reagan administration to highlight the diffi-
culties of White House centralization of civil rights. The discussion 
will also call attention to the limits of confrontational reform strat-
egies, such as those embraced by the Reagan Justice Department, 
and the potential of incremental bureaucratic reforms, such as 
those embraced by the Reagan ·Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission ("EEOC"). Part III will consider how the Bush White 
House responded to Reagan's civil rights legacy. Specifically, rather 
than be heartened by the prospects of bureaucratic reform, the 
Bush White House apparently dwelled on the costs of confronta-
tional approaches. The outcome was a strategy of issue avoidance. 
Part IV will examine Bush's management of the 1991 Civil Rights 
Act. This examination will also contrast presidential authority to 
shape legislative content with presidential authority over imple-
mentation. Part V will offer a brief summary of the Article's find-
ings. 
II. THE LESSONS OF RONALD REAGAN18 
The reaches and limits of White House civil rights efforts can 
be seen in Reagan's efforts to centralize civil rights policy. Reagan 
took office at the height of federal efforts to impose numerical 
measures of equality. During the Carter years, existing programs, 
such as Executive Order 11,246 requirements for federal. contrac-
tors and Small Business Administration ("SBA") incentives for 
minority entrepreneurs, were strengthened; numerous race and 
gender-conscious initiatives were launched throughout federal 
departments and agencies.19 Reagan ran on a platform which 
made opposition to these Carter initiatives a centerpiece of his 
campaign, arguing that "equal opportunity should not be jeopar-
dized by bur.eaucratic regulations and decisions which rely on 
quotas, ratios, and numerical requirements to exclude some indi-
18 Portions of this Part are adapted from Neal Devins, The Civil /Ughts Hydra, 89 
MICH. L. REv. 1723, 1749-63 (1991). 
19 8« gmerally HERMAN BEIZ, EQUAIJ1Y TRANSFORMED: A QUARTER CENTuRY OF AmR.-
MATIVE AcnoN (1991); Chester E. Finn, Jr., "A.ffi171U1.tive Action,. Under Reagan, CoMMEN-
TARY, Apr. 1982, at 17, H~-20. 
1993] CML RIGHI'S UNDER BUSH 959 
viduals in favor of others, thereby rendering such regulations and 
decisions inherently discriminatory. "20 
The manner in which Reagan sought, to change these pro-
grams, however, belied his campaign rhetoric. Some programs 
were challenged, others left alone, and a few even defended. This 
lack of clarity evidences real limits in White House centralization 
efforts. 21 First, federal civil rights enforcement sweeps throughout 
the executive branch; hence, effective White House coordination is 
almost impossible. Unless a President makes civil right enforce-
ment the benchmark of, his administration, discontinuity seems 
unavoidable. Second, once a law is enac~d and the initial imple-
menting regulations promulgated, it is extraordinarily difficult to 
reconsider en masse the enforcement schemes of prior administra-
tions. Oversight committee and constituency interest opposition is 
simply too formidable here. Consequently, secondary devices such 
as reorganization and policy prioritization-which do not directly 
attack existing regulations-are often the best mechanism for 
change available to the White House. Admittedly, reliance on such 
secondary devices limits a Presidenfs civil rights legacy, for succes-
sor administrations can easily reset priorities and reorganize agen-
cies. Nonetheless, during the Reagan years, entities such as the 
EEOC, which relied on secondary devices, advanced their agenda 
far more effectively than those such as the Justice Department, 
which launched frontal assaults against existing programs. Indeed, 
when Reagan left the White House, the entire scheme of bureau-
cratic regulations and decisions attacked by candidate Ronald 
Reagan withstood Justice Department efforts to actualize this cam-
paign promise. 22 · 
20 1980 Republican Platform, reprinted in 36 CONG. Q. ALMANAc 50-B, 62-B (1980). 
Centra 1980 Democratic Platform, reprinted in 36 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 91-B, 105-B (1980) 
("(A]n effective affirmative action program in an essential component of our commitment 
to expanding civil rights protections.j. Reagan, moreover, did not change his rhetoric 
once in office. 
21 Curiously, one of the best demonstrations that the President is powerful but not 
omnipotent is that Reagan civil rights policy came under attack from both the left and 
the righL From the right, Jeremy Rabkin, pointing to the administration's support o.f 
numerous affirmative action programs, accused the Reagan administration of "wring[ing] 
what[ever] partisan advantage it can from the pattern of racial and ethnic spoils estab-
lished in the 1970s." Jeremy Rabkin, Reagan's Se~l Quotas, NEW RE.Pusuq, Aug. 5, 1985, 
at 15, 17. From the left, the civil rights community issued numerous reports condemning· 
the administration record as "absolutely deplorable," straining the relationship between 
the national government and black America. Finn, supra note 19, at 1'7. 
22 &e BELZ, supra note 19, at 181-207; Rabkin, supra note 21; EAsr:LAND, supra note 
2 at 178-89. 
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A. The Improbability of Centralization 
Every government agency, department, and commission ts tn 
the business of civil rights enforcement. Title VI requirements 
prohibiting nondiscrimination in federal assistance are enforced by 
all government agencies distributing federal largess; EEOC regula-
tions call for sensitivity by all government agencies to numerical 
equality objectives in their own hiring. Moreover, freestanding civil 
rights enforcement projects exist within the EEOC, SBA, Federal 
Communications Commission, Civil Rights Commission, the Legal 
Services Corporation, and the Departments of Energy, Treasury, 
Labor, Education, Commerce, Transportation, and Justice. Given 
the pervasiveness of civil rights enforcement, centralization can 
occur only if the White House both makes coordination a primary 
objective and is extremely diligent in appointing to key govern-
ment posts individuals who agree with the President's views on 
civil rights enforcement. Otherwise, competing regulatory agenda 
items will take precedence over civil rights enforcement and, 
correlatively, external pressures from oversight committees and 
constituency interests will dilute the White House agenda. 
Reagan White House civil rights centralization efforts clearly 
suffered from internal and external coordination problems. Inter-
nal problems derived from the existence of several competing 
strategies of regulatory relief within the executive branch. The 
most visible strategy--commonly associated with the Department of 
Justice ("DOJ") in general and Civil Rights Division head William 
Bradford Reynolds in particular-was moralistic and rhetorically 
divisive. It viewed preferential treatment "based on nothing more 
than personal characteristics of race or gender ... as (just as] 
offensive to standards of human decency today as it was some 84 
years ago when countenanced under Plessy v. Ferguson. "23 It was 
also confrontational, calling for immediate and massive judicial, 
regulatory, and legislative reform. 
The willingness of DOJ to launch a frontal assault on numeri-
cal proofs of discrimination and nonvictim relief is unique, howev-
23 Oversight Hearings on Equal EmpW;yment opportunity and Affirm4tive Action, 1981: 
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on EmpW;ymmt opportunities of the Comm. on Education and La· 
her, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1, at 137 (1981) (citation omitted) (statement of William 
Bradford Reynolds); see also William Bradford Reynolds, Individualism vs. Group !Ughts: The 
Legacy of Brown, 93 YALE LJ. 995, 99S.1001 (1984) (individual rights best protected 
thro~gh race.neutral means). 
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er. The preferred strategy of other civil rights enforcement agen-
cies was to leave existing programs on the books but to limit the 
effectiveness of those programs through a variety of enforcement 
strategies. Furthermore, agencies not principally in the business of 
civil rights enforcement-even if sympathetic to the DOJ's moral 
imperative-focused their attentions on other regulatory initiatives. 
Finally, at least with respect to minority business enterprise pro-
grams housed .in the SBA as well as the Departments of Transpor-
tation and Commerce, the Reagan administration and its appoint-
ees favored some of the affirmative action initiatives launched by 
Presidents Nixon and Carter.24 
These varied strategies ensured a certain degree of disunity in 
Reagan civil rights policies. Ironically, this disunity can be ex-
plained, in part, by efforts towards White House centralization. 
Most significant, "movement conservatives" at DOJ and the White 
House saw themselves in the midst of a holy war that required 
uniform adherence to the Justice. creed. As caricatured by former 
Education Secretary T.H. Bell, these "extremists" would say': "Let 
the chaos come . . . . This is part of the revolution! Pragmatism is 
cowardice and weakness! "25 In the end, however, this absolutist 
approach undermined any chance of effective White House cen-
tralization. 
The keys to this failure are three extraordinary policy blun-
ders made by the President at the urging of the DOJ. First, 
Reagan's ostensible commitment to simple nondiscrimination was 
called into question when his administration sought in 1982 to 
restore the tax-exempt status of racially discriminatory private 
schools. 26 Second, in the midst of this fiasco, Reagan announced 
his opposition to provisions of the 1982 Voting Rights. Act 
amendments which make disparate racial impact an important 
evidentiary tool in voting rights cases. 27 In explaining the 
administration's position, a "hearing room full of civil-rights activ- ' 
24 See Robert Pear, Administration CJwllm~ Plan by Rights Panel, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 11, 
1986, at AI. . 
25 Terrel H. Bell, Education Policy Deue!opment in the Reagan Administration, PHI DELTA 
KAPPAN, Mar. 1986, at 487, 491; see also TERREL H. BELL, THE THIRTEENTH MAN 99-118 
(1988). 
26 Treasury Sets New Policy on Tax-Exempts, Aller.s Position on Private Schools, Daily Exec. 
Rep. (BNA) No. 5, at G-3 (Jan. 8, 1982). See gmerally Jeremy A. Rabkin, Taxing Discrimi-
nation: Federal ~lation of Private Education by the Internal Revenue Service, in PuBUC VAL-
UES, PRivATE ScHOOLS 138 (Neal Devins ed., 1989). 
27 The Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982 can be found at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b 
(1988). 
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ists erupted into laughter" when Attomey General Smith remarked 
that "the President doesn't have a discriminatory bone in his 
body."28 Third, in 1983, President Reagan (unsuccessfully) sought 
to remove Mary Frances Berry and two of her colleagues from the 
allegedly "independent, bipartisan" United States Commission on 
Civil Rights.29 In their stead, Reagan advanced three nominees 
who, according to Reagan, "don't worship at the altar of forced 
busing and mandatory quotas" and "don't believe you can remedy 
past discrimination by mandating new discrimination. "30 Although 
he had good reason to be fed up with the Commission's partisan 
attacks on his administration,31 Reagan's efforts here, as Senator 
Edward Kennedy put it, appeared to be "an unprecedented assault 
on the independence and integrity of the Civil Rights Commis-
sion."32 
This assault on the Commission, along with Reagan's efforts 
to grant tax breaks to discriminatory private schools, limit voting 
rights reform, and enable the DOJ to launch a frontal assault on 
preferential hiring, came at a significant political cost. The Leader-
ship Conference on Civil Rights, for example, cast Reagan as a 
villain, arguing that "power and prejudice" rather than 
"fairmindedness and fidelity to law" "hold sway" in his adminis-
tration.33 Pragmatists with,in the administration thought it politi-
cally unwise for the White House itself to expend further political 
capital in this area. Furthermore, Reagan appointees at other 
agencies witnessed and learned from these events that confronta-
tional politics came at a high cost. Consequently, although the 
DOJ persisted in its frontal assault upon race-conscious affirmative 
action, neither the White House nor other agencies assisted them. 
The failure of the Reagan White House to centralize civil 
rights enforcement is not surprising. Despite Reagan's alleged 
ideological vision and his attempts to centralize govemment regu-
28 Finn, supra note 19, at 27. 
29 S« George Lardner Jr., 3 on Rights Commission 'Terminated' by Reagan, WASH. POST, 
Oct. 26, I 983, at A2. 
30 S« Juan WilJiams, Reagans Offers Difense on !Ughts Record, WASH. POST, Aug. 2, 
1983, at 1. 
31 S« Finn, supra note 19, at 24-25; Chester E. Finn, Jr., From Civil !Ughts to special 
Interests, WALL Sr. J., Mar. 22, · 1983, at 32. 
32 See Presidential NominatUms to 1M Civil !Ughts Commission: Hearings on 1M Nominations 
of Morris B. Abram, John A. Bunul, &bert A. Destro, and Linda Chavez Before the Com77L on 
1M Judiciary of 1M Senate, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 219 (1983) (statement of Sen. Edward 
Kennedy). 
33 LEADERSHIP CoNFERENCE ON CML RlGJITS, Wmtour JUSTICE 75 (1982). 
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lation, numerous intemal and extemal pressures undermined a 
coordinated civil rights enforcement strategy. Some of these pres- ' 
sures are endemic to all administrations. For example, the inevita-
bly divergent interests of govemment agencies and departments 
had previously doomed JC?hnson, Kennedy, and Carter administra-
tion efforts at interagency coordination.54 However, some of the 
problems the ·Reagan administration faced were unique unto it. A 
highly ideological group of "movement conservatives," Reagan's 
reliance on delegating authority to like-minded individuals to ac-
complish centralization objectives, and the simple fact that the 
Reagan administration was butting heads with mainstream civil 
rights interests were circumstances peculiar to the Reagan adminis-
tration. 
That the Reagan administration did not speak with one voice 
highlights the difficulty of coordinating civil rights pqlicy in the 
modem administrative state. That difficulty, however, does not 
mean that the White House is without suJ>stantial power in this 
area. 
B. Bureaucratic v. Confrontational Approaches to 
Alter Regulatory Policymaking 
The Reagan experiment tells a very revealing story about. the 
limits of agency power to modify existing regulatory structures. 
Direct repeal of existing interpretations and regulations is unlikely 
to succeed. Indirect attacks launched through agency reorganiza-
tion and policy prioritization are far more likely to succeed. The 
Reagan experience reveals that civil rights politics is the "art of 
the possible." Although DOJ efforts to change the face of civil 
rights were a highly visible political failure, that failure, in many 
respects, was one of politics, not ideology. At the EEOC, Chairman 
Clarence Thomas proved remarkably adept at advancing many of 
the same goals that made the DOJ the subject of public ridicule. 
An administration must recognize both its potential, as well as· 
its limitations. The repudiation of well~ntrenched ,civil rights pro-
grams comes at a high political cost. Bitter confrontations with 
Congress, often resulting in the enactment of program-saving legis-
lation, is a likely outcome of such direct challenges. The Reagan 
34 5« HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, lHE CML RIGHTS ERA 44, 64 (1990) (Kennedy apmin· 
istration); id. at 181..84, 192 (Johnson administration); U.S. COMM'N ON CML RIGlffS, 
lHE FEDERAL CML RIGHTS ENFORCEMENr EFFORT-1977 331 (1977) (Carter administra· 
tion). 
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DOJ bears this out. In sharp contrast, little political capital is ex-
. pended in displacing disfavored policy through indirect tech-
niques. The Thomas EEOC was a master at such policymaking. By 
shifting scarce agency resources from disfavored to preferred poli-
cy objectives, the agency proved adept at making policy inroads 
while eschewing counterproductive toe to toe battles with Con-
gress. 
Remarkably, while avoiding such battles, Clarence Thomas was 
an outspoken critic of race and gender preferences.85 Indeed, in 
explaining initiatives which shifted agency resources away from 
group-conscious programs, Thomas spoke in one breath about the 
costs of affirmative action and the virtues of individual-centered 
relief. Ideology and political strategy then operated in tandem at 
the Thomas EEOC; Thomas both spoke and acted on an individu-
alistic agenda. In sharp contrast, the Reynolds DOJ offered no 
constructive alternative. Its attacks on group relief were not coun-
terbalanced by reform initiatives. 
A comparison between the Thomas EEOC and the Reynolds 
DOJ reveals that an administration can advance a modest civil 
rights agenda inconsistent with legislative preferences without suf: 
fering devastating political costs.36 To the extent that Bush's inco-
herent civil rights policies were rooted in the prohibitive costs of 
such an agenda, the Thomas EEOC serves as a telling counter-
example. 
35 He told Congress that "numerically based remedies which focus on sex, race or 
ethnic considerations have the potential to undermine the ultimate goals of nondiscrim-
ination." Policies Regan:ling Goals and Timetabks in Liligation Remedies: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Employment opportunities of the House Comm. on Education and lAhar, 99th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1986) [hereinafter Hearings]. He also said that the 1978 guidelines 
"assume some inherent inferiority of blacks, hispanics, other minorities, and women, by 
suggesting tha~ they should not be held to the same standards as other people." Juan 
Williams, A Q:testion of Fairness, ATIANTIC, Feb. 1987, at 70. Furthermore, statistical proofs 
of discrimination fail to recognize "cultural differences • . • , education levels, commuting 
patte~s, and other 'previous events'" that help explain disparities. Id. at 73. 
36 The comparison between the DOJ and the EEOC is a fair one despite the many 
structural differences between these two entities. Admittedly, the bulk of DOJ 
policymaking is a by-product of adversarial litigation, not bureaucratic enforcement. At 
the same time, the most visible failures of the Reagan DOJ are tied to legislative and 
regulatory initiatives that the DOJ advocated before the White House and federal agen-
cies. Moreover, like the DOJ, the EEOC-which lacks cease and desist authority-typically 
advances its policy objectives through litigation. 
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1. The EEOC 
The Thomas EEOC, at first glance, seems hardly a model of 
successful policymaking. Although it had voiced objections to both 
affirmative action r~medies and numerical measures of discrimina-
tion contained in the agency's. 1978 Uniform Guidelines, the 
Thomas EEOC never formally modified pre-existing Carter EEOC 
regulations.s7 In fact, Thomas explicitly endorsed the use of goals 
and timetables, despite his personal objections, at Senate reconfir-
mation hearings.88 Moreover, on several occasions, the EEOC 
locked horns with DOJ on the numerical ~quality issue.s9 Finally, 
despite the Office of Management and Budget's ("OMB") request 
that the agency undertake a cost efficiency review of the 1978 
guidelines, 40 the EEOC balked-apparently because the political 
costs of revision were too high. 
This reluctance to repudiate existing policies, however, 
masked the massive changes which took place at the EEOC. Indi-
rect attacks launched through resource prioritization, reorganiza-
tion, and· an unwillingness to adopt new theories that might ex-
pand agency jurisdiction proved the mechanism of reform at the 
agency. At this game, the EEOC proved hugely successful. 
Thomas, rather than rescind Carter· initiatives, replaced this 
regime with enforcement strategies that sought relief for identifi-
able victims of discrimination. In September 1984, the agency 
announced it would place greater emphasis on litigation to secure 
redress for employment discrlmination.41 In February 1985, the 
EEOC issued a policy statement which made clear that its pursuit 
of this litigation strategy would "eradicat[e] discrimination in the 
87 Alternatively, the Thomas EEOC should instruct a liberal President how to ad-
vance his civil rights agenda when confronted with a conservative Congress. 
38 See e.g., Nomination of Clarence Tlwmas, of Missouri, to be Chairman of the Equal Em-
ployment opportunity CommissUm: Hearing Before the Smale Comm. on lAbor and Human &-
SOUI'US', 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1986). 
89 These disputes concerned the DOJ's representation of the EEOC before the Su-
preme Court, intervention in lower federal court cases in which the EEOC was a party, 
and refusal to comply with EEOC affirmative action guidelines for federal agencies and 
departments. For overview critiques, see U.S. COMM'N ON CML RIGHTS, FEDERAL ENFORCE-
MENT OF EQUAL EMPLOYMENr REQUIREMENTS 40-42 (1987) [hereinafter 1987 CRC RE-
PORT]. 
40 &e Felicity Barringer, Job Bias Dehate is Reopened, WASH. Posr; Aug. 14, 1981, at 
A27; 1987 CRC REPORT, suJrra note 89, at 24. 
41 Statemenl of Enfun:ement Policy, EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) § lll, at GC:3008 (Sept. 
11, 1984). 
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workplace" by providing relief for identified victims of discrimina-
tion. 42 Placing such emphasis on individual make-whole relief 
made fewer resources available to pursue class action cases (whose 
remedies often included goals, timetables, and quotas).-tS 
Correlatively, this new emphasis on "certainty and predictability in 
enforcement and the securing of full remedial, curative and pre-
ventive relief' brought with it the demise of a rapid charge system 
focusing on quick setdements of individual complaints.44 At the 
same time, class action litigation was not eliminated, but simply 
reduced (from sixty-seven percent to thirty-five percent of all 
nonsubpoena cases).45 However, the substance of class 'action 
awards did change dramatically. By focusing on individ:ual victims 
within a class, the EEOC typically rejected goals and timetables in 
favor of backpay awards.46 In a related development, the EEOC 
retooled its office in charge of so-called "systemic" discrimination 
lawsuits. Rather than using statistical proofs and targeting large 
employers such as AT&T and Sears, Thomas modified both the 
scope and sweep of the systemic effort by focusing on smaller 
.employers and making use of on-site investigations. 
While shifting the focus of EEOC activities, Thomas did not 
rest his case on the rhetorical arguments that lay at the heart of 
the DOJ's campaign against race preferences. Instead, he took an 
affirmative stance, arguing that the shift to an individual-centered 
approach would place greater pressure on employers to eradicate 
discriminatory practices. 47 Thomas also defended back pay and 
other individual make-whole relief as an effective deterrent to 
employment discrimination. Unlike goals and timetables, which 
42 Policy Statement on Remedies and &lief for Individual Cases of Unklwful Discrimination, 
EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) § III, at GC:3005 (Feb. 5, 1985). 
43 Williams, supra n~te 35, at 70, 80. 
44 See EEOC, EEOC's NEW CHARGE PROCESSING APPROACH 2 (1984). By eschewing 
administrative conciliation in favor of a more scrutinizing examination of employee com-
plaints, the Thomas EEOC dismissed twice as many (roughly 56%) of its cases as without 
merit. Hearings, supra note 35, at 193, 211 (report of Women's Employment Institute). 
45 See 1987 CRC REPORT, supra note 39, at 38. 
46 In fact, by narrowly reading Supreme Court decisions which approved of numeri-
cal remedies, the EEOC could find that circumstances in which preferential relief was on 
the table were virtually nonexistent. For example, during the period from October 1985 
to July 1986, the EEOC did not approve a single case in which goals and timetables were 
"an issue." I d. 
47 Systemic litigation rooted in statistical proofs, in contrast, was depicted as a costly 
failure. For example, in a systemic suit involving Sears, not only did the court accuse the 
agency of "present[ing} no credible evidence," but the case's casts were so great as to 
threaten an agency-wide staff furlough at one point. EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 
F. Supp. 1264, 1302 (N.D. Ill. 1986). 
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shifted the cost from employers to those neither hired nor pro-
moted, backpay awards came directly from employers' pockets. 
Resource prioritization, which enabled the EEOC to displace 
problematic programs grounded in numerical proofs and classwide 
relief with preferred individual-oriented programs, proved the most 
significant mechanism for reform at the EEOC. The EEOC also 
accomplished change through two other nonconfrontational devic-
es: agency reorganization and policymaking through the agency's 
stated refusal to discover new "vistas" of the law. 
The ostensible purposes of agency reorganizations are to 
"maximize efficiency and economy, promote effective planning and 
coordination, reduce program fragmentation and overlap, elimi-
nate unnecessary papetwork, and increase accountability.~ Reor-
ganizations, however, ~so enable political appointees to maintain 
greater control over their operations by staffing newly created 
offices with a cadre of trustworthy individuals. Through the cre-
ation of an Office of Legal Counsel charged with interagency 
coordination and the drafting. of regulations, political appointees 
at the EEOC displaced careerists in ·controlling policy develop-
ment. 49 The agency also made effective use of a reorganization 
by transferring systemic litigation from a separate office to political 
appointees within the Office of General Counsel, while moving 
systemic compliance to the newly structured O~ce of Progx:am 
Operations. 50 
The EEOC, moreover, proved adept at policymaking through 
inaction, that is, refusing to adopt reform initiatives. During the 
Reagan years, for example, the agency rejected comparable worth 
as a mechanism of determining job discrimination under Title VII, 
declined to extend Tide VII to professional certification and li-
. censing, and refused to adopt regulations extending the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act to apprenticeship programs.51 
The significance of these refusals, while not altering the status quo 
ante, are profound. Witness the comparable worth decision. The 
Thomas EEOC flatly rejected, as "[without] statutory basis or case 
48 GEORGE C. EADs &: MICHAEL Fix, REuEF OR REFORM? REAGAN'S REGUlATORY DI-
LEMMA 156 (1984). 
49 ~ 1987 CRC REPoRT, supra note 39, at 18-19. 
50 Id. 
51 EEOC Decision No. 85-80, 1985 EEOC LEXIS 19 (July 12, 1985) (comparable worth 
decision); EEOC Decision No. 87-2, 2 Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH) t 6869 (Aug. 31, 1987); 
Seleckd Stalemenls Delivered January 28, 1988, to the House Select Comm. on Aging, Daily Lab. 
Rep. (BNA) No. 19,. at E-1 (Jan. 28, 1988). 
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law support," equalizing the salaries of jobs held predominantly by 
women and the salaries of "comparable" jobs held predominantly 
by men.52 In stark contrast, the Carter EEOC had seemed ready 
to endorse this concept. In 1979, Eleanor Holmes Norton, chair-
man of the Carter EEOC, endorsed comparable worth,58 later 
calling it the "cutting edge" labor issue of the 1980s because it 
addressed "the deepest, least-touched levels of discrimination. "54 
EEOC policymaking through resource prioritization, reorgani-
zation, and inaction transformed the agency during Thomas' ten-
ure. Thomas' success here is largely attributable to his 
policymaking strategy. Costly political battles associated with the 
repeal of existing regulations were rejected in favor of indirect 
techniques of _resource prioritization, reorganization, and inaction. 
In other words, rather than launch an attack on civil rights con-
stituencies and their friends on congressional oversight commit-
tees, Thomas proved skillful at working within a political culture. 
Ultimately, the 1978 Affirmative Action Guidelines stayed in 
place despite White House pressures and an internal agency re-
view. Race and gender goals and timetables were never formally 
examined. In fact, after Acting General Counsel Johnny Butler's 
oral instruction to staff attorneys not to include goals in new set-
tlements caused an uproar in 1986, the EEOC formally endorsed 
goals and timetables. 55 In addition, over the objections of the 
DOJ, the EEOC continued to require that federal agencies submit 
to affirmative action plans. 56 Finally, Thomas appealed the 
EEOC's defeat in Sears and other systemic cases because if he 
hadn't "the liberals would be all over me. "57 This acquiescence to 
the Carter legacy led civil rights groups such as the National Ur-
ban League and NOW to admit at Thomas' 1986 reconfirmation 
hearings that "given this administration's record [we] have no 
illusions that a nominee committed to strong enforcement would 
replace [Thomas]. "58 
52 EEOC Decision No. 85-80, supra note 51, at *9. 
53 Carol Krucoff, Mrmey: The Question of Mm, Women and •eomparahle Worlh," WASH. 
POST, Nov. 13, 19'79, at B5. 
54 CWA Conference Addresses !SStU of Comparable Worth in Public Sector, Daily Lab. Rep. 
(BNA) No. 50, at A-5 (March 14, 1984). 
55 Bade to Hiring Goals, TIME, Aug. 4, 1986, at 29. 
56 Wtlliams, supra note 35, at '76. 
5'7 Id. 
58 Id. at '7'7. 
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Congressional action mirrored this begrudging acceptance of . 
Thomas. While disapproving of the EEOC's displacement of class-
wide strategies, the agency's shift from one legitimate policy objec-
tive to another did not raise legislative ire to the retaliation point. 
Congress simply could not repudiate Thomas' stated "intent to 
pursue quality investigation of charges, to make victims whole and 
to ensure that injustices are corrected not repeated. "59 Moreover,. · 
Thomas' arguments regarding the effectiveness of backpay and 
other make-whole remedies could not be rejected as either far 
fetched or mean spirited. Finally, since budgetary constraints re-
sulted in the loss of more than fifty attorneys, EEOC attention to 
identifiable victims of discrimination necessarily resulted in de-
creasing attention elsewhere. Put simply: Thomas, by making a 
sound case for his policy initiatives, effectively put Congress on the 
defensive for failing to allocate adequate funding to the agency. 60 
2. The Failure of Confrontation~ Strategies 
The EEOC's success stands in marked contrast to the failures 
of the DOJ, the FCC, and the Civil Rights Commission. These 
agencies' efforts to repeal existing programs pushed Congress past 
the brink. Congress, for example, used its confirmation power to 
punish individuals within the administration who spearheaded 
confrontational operations-most notably Brad Reynolds whose 
appointment to the Associate Attorney General position at DOJ 
was turned down.61 Furthermore, FCC efforts. to rescind the 
granting of preferences to minority broadcasters were greeted by 
the enactment of single year funding rest:I?ctions forbidding such 
reconsideration. 62 This direct challenge to existing rulemaking, 
combined with the FCC's repeal of the Fairness Doctrine, "so 
poisoned relations between the two entities that it stimulated con-
59 Id. at 74 •• 
60 Indeed, as Norman Amaker concluded in an Urban Institute study otherwise criti-
cal of Reagan civil rights: 'The interpretation of the data [on the EEOC] ultimately de-
pends on one's perspective of what is important for the agency to do-a matter of em-
phasis." NORMAN AMAKER, CML RIGHTS AND THE REAGAN .ADMINISTRATION 110 (1988). 
61 See James R. Dickinson, Running Scared in Pennsylvania: Sen. spectre Aims to Suroive 
in Demtx:ralic Territory, WASH. Posr, July 6, 1985, at A4; Paul Duke, Senate Paml Rejects 
Reagan Nominee for Associate A~ General Post, WAIL ST. J., June 28, 1985, at A3; 
Howard Kurtz, Reyncld's Nomination Voted Down, WASH. Posr, June 28, 1985 at AI. 
62 See gmnrdly Neal Devins, Congms, the FCC. and the Search for the PuMic Trustee, LAW 
& CONIEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming fall 1993). 
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gressional oversight of a magnitude Washington insiders say is 
unprecedented. n6S . 
Congress used its power of the purse in other ways to correct 
agencies which disregarded their past legislative preferences. This 
was the fate suffered by the Civil Rights Commission and its con-
troversial chairman, Clarence Pendelton. The Commission was 
unwilling to play ball with Congress and so Congress subjected it 
to an extensive General Accounting Office ("GAO") audit, severely 
reduced its appropriations, directed it to pursue specified research 
priorities, and ordered it to allocate its appropriations internally 
according to a restrictive legislative formula (including limitations 
on travel and· staff support for Pendelton).64 
The most visible failure of confrontational politics and the 
most vivid contrast to the EEOC, however, is the Department of 
Justice. Justice was aggressive in challenging-on both statutory 
and constitutional grounds-the legality of race and gender prefer-
ences, arguing that affirmative action was "at war with the Ameri-
can ideal of equal opportunity for each person to achieve whatev-
er his or her industry and -talents warrant. »55 In court, DOJ ef-
forts proved a mixed success. 66 Most significantly, efforts to en-
tirely discredit race and sex preferences clearly failed. During 
Reynolds' tenure, the Supreme Court validated a range of hiring 
and promotion schemes that benefitted nonvictims. In several of 
these cases, moreover, the Supreme Court rebuked the DOJ for 
departing from past governmental efforts that had supported a.fJir-
mative action. At the same time, however, the Supreme Court 
barred state-sponsored nonremedial set-asides and layoffs of senior 
nonminority employees. 
Outside of court, DOJ efforts to reshape federal affirmative 
action policy proved an unabashed disaster. Its positions on tax 
breaks for discriminatory schools and voting rights brought noth-
ing but embarrassment and ridicule; its objections to the Civil 
Rights Restoration Act led Congress to override a presidential 
63 Micromanagnnent of the FCC: Here to Stay, BROADCASTING, Dec. 26, 1988, at 56. 
64 See David Brock, Politicizing the Government's Watchdog, WAIL ST. J., July 16, 1986, at 
A22; Howard Kurtz, Hill S/4shes Funding for Rights PaJUl, WASH. PoST, OcL 19, 1986, at 
A12. 
65 See Mary Thornton, Reagan. Aide Differ on Hiring Policy, WASH. PoST, Dec. 1981, at 
A8 (quoting William Bradford Reynolds, head of the Civil Rights Division of the Justice 
Department). 
66 See ~ Neal Devins, Affirmative Action Ajln- Reagan. 68 TEX. L. REv. 353 
(1989); Herman Schwartz, The 1986 and 1987 Affirmative Action Cases: It's AU Over but the 
Shouting, 86 MICH. L. REv. 524 (198'7). 
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veto;67 and its efforts ·to relitigate fifty-one affirmative action con-
sent decrees involving state and municipal govemment provoked a 
rift between the DOJ and the states (as well as a series of striking 
defeats in court).68 These failures, however, pale by comparison 
to the defeat the DOJ suffered within the executive branch. 
Reagan appointees at other agencies witnessed and leamed 
from the DOJ that confrontational politics come at a high cost. 
For example, Clarence Thomas, recognizing that Justice "blew it" 
politically with its "negative agenda, »69 opposed DOJ intervention 
in EEOC litigation as well as Justice's refusal to comply with EEOC 
affirmative action guidelines.7° Furthermore, the White House 
often discounted DOJ initiatives as too politically risky. Take the 
case of Justice's failed efforts to modify Executive Order 11,246 
programs-requiring 325,000 govemment contractors to adopt 
affirmative action plans. 71 Pragmatists within the administration 
like Labor Secretary Bill Brock thought it "politically crazy" for the 
White House to expend further political capital in this area. Don-
ald Regan, Secretary of the Treasury during the tax exemption 
controversy and later Chief of Staff, agreed. As Brad Reynolds 
came to recognize, "Bob Jones was Don Regan's tar baby and he 
was not about to have another such fiasco. "72 Ironically, as a re-
sult of this campaign, the Reagan administration reinstated Carter-
era enforcement policies that it had earlier abandoned, thereby 
strengthening the executive order program. 78 
The political failures of the DO], moreover, cannot now be 
justified as an acceptable short-term cost to change the face of 
civil rights policymaking. Reynolds' confrontational strategy was 
easily depicted as a civil rights retreat. The Bob Jones fiasco, the 
firing of politically incorrect Civil Rights Commissioners, and the 
attempt to run rough shod over state and local govemment by 
challenging pre-existing settlement agreements made it easy to cast 
67 Message to the Senate Rerurning Without Approval the Civil Rights Restoration 
Act of 198'1 and Transmitting Alternative Legislation, 1 PUB. PAPERS 345 (Mar. 16, 1988) 
(veto message); see also· 124 CONG. REc. H10'12, S2'165 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1988) (over-
ride); Civil Rights Restoration Act of 198'7, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (codified at 
42 u.s.c. §§ 1681, 168'1 (1988)). 
68 See Schwartz, supra note 66, at 525-26. 
· 69 WJ.lliams, supra note 35, at 80. 
'70 See 198'7 CRC REPoRT, supra note 39. 
'11 For an insightful recount of this episode, see Gary L. McDowell, Affirmative Inac-
tion, PoL REv., Spring 1989, at 32. 
72 Id. at 35. 
73 ld. at 33. 
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Reynolds as villain. As such, Reynolds was hard pressed to gain the 
upper hand in the battle over group preferences. 
Justice's efforts to impose its imprimatur on Reagan civil 
rights enforcement undermined a more modest and potentially 
successful approach. Recurring enforcement strategies of the Rea-
gan administration generally eschewed repudiation of existing 
programs in favor of, as George Eads and Michael Fix observed, 
"adoption of a new and more exclusive screening criteria for iden-
tifying potential violators; unwillingness to test new legal or eco-
nomic theories that might expand the existing classes of violators; 
[and] reduced discretion for field enforcement personnel. "74 This 
more modest approach would have been less subject to political 
attack and, consequently, might well have withstood oversight 
committee and constituency group pressure. That is the very les-
son of the Reagan EEOC-an agency which followed this model. 
The Reagan experiment tells a very revealing story about the 
limits of agency power to modify existing regulatory structures. 
Once a law is enacted and the initial implementing regulations 
promulgated, it is extraordinarily difficult to reconsider en masse 
the enforcement schemes of prior administrations. Oversight com-
mittees and constituency interest opposition is simply too formida-
ble at this point. Direct repeal of existing interpretations and 
regulations therefore is unlikely to succeed. These roadblocks, 
however, do not foreclose White House influences. Instead, they 
deny presidential supremacy and force an administration to sup-
plement traditional policymaking through rulemaking with back-
door policymaking devices like appointments, agency reorganiza-. 
tion, and resource prioritization. Although such policymaking 
devices are necessarily temporary (for subsequent administrations 
can exercise the powers of appointment, resource prioritization, 
and reorganization to displace their predecessors' objectives), these 
devices play quite a large role in civil rights enforcement. 
The Reagan years then tell a cautionary tale about executive 
power. Implementation strategies with modest objectives can move 
agency policymaking in the direction of administration priorities. 
However, once constituency and congressional expectations are 
well settled, effqrts to replace existing approaches with a new 
regime will meet tremendous resistance. Since Congress holds the 
ultimate trun1p card with, among other things, its power of the 
purse, direct attacks such as those launched by the FCC, the Civil 
74 EAns & FIX, supra note 48, at 193-94. 
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Rights Commission, and especially the DOJ seem doomed to fail-
ure. Consequently, after the enactment of legislation and promul-
gation of initial agency regulations and interpretations, executive 
power lies principally at the margins. As such, White House cen-
tralization efforts cannot rewrite the nation's civil rights agenda. 
Furthermore, only a jerry-rigged structure can be assembled with 
the tools of executive power-appointments, reorganization, policy 
prioritization-and hence it is unlikely that a President will be 
able to establish a civil rights legacy. 
However, these limits on executive power should not be over-
stated. Clarence Thomas nullified a great deal of Carter era nu-
merical equality initiatives. Although the ephemeral nature of 
Thomas' weapons for reform makes his legacy vulnerable, the 
Reagan EEOC is a testament to the fact that an agency willing to 
swim against the political current nonetheless possesses substantial 
power. 
Ill. GEORGE BUSH'S CML RIGHTS AGENDA 
The lessons of the Reagan era were lost to the Bush presiden-
cy. Rather than follow "in· the tradition of Ronald Reagan, "75 as 
the 1988 Republican platform promised, . the Bush administration 
sought to distance itself from its predecessor. Had Bush-like Bill 
Clinton-disagreed with Reagan's rhetorical attack against prefer-
ences, such distancing would undoubtedly have been appropriate. 
Moreover, had Bush taken issue with the confrontational style of 
some of the Reagan officials, changes in executive political strate-
gies too would be expected. An argument, I suppose, can be made 
that differences between the Reagan and Bush approaches to civil 
rights reflect such differences in personal philosophy and leader-
ship style. These differences, however, are rooted in Bush's ab-
sence of vision rather than his endorsement of a competing vision. 
Bush officials saw civil rights as a special interest mine 
field-better avoided than navigated. The negative publicity gar-
nished by, and ultimate ineffectiveness of, the confrontational 
Reagan administration approaches likely figured in this calculation. 
That these controversies would dw~ the bureaucratic strategies 
advanced at the EEOC and elsewhere also comes as no surprise. 
Vice-President George Bush was directly involved in these Reagan-
'15 1988 Republican Party Platform, reprinted in 46 CoNG. Q. ALMANAc 2369, 2399 
(1988). 
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era civil rights disputes, often advocating a position at odds with 
the ideologically driven Jl!stice Department. 76 The day to day 
management of the EEOC, in contrast, was an unlikely target to 
appear on the radar screen of Bush or his staff. 
Reagan-era controversies tell only part of the story. Bush nev-
er saw himself as either an ideological warrior or a keeper of the 
Reaganesque flame. His approach to domestic policymaking, as has 
been countlessly recounted in the wake of his 1992 electoral de-
feat, was reactive issue-avoidance. 
Civil rights appears a model of Bush's lack of commitment 
and vision. The story begins well before 1988. From 1963 to 1970, 
when Bush served in the House of Representatives and ran for 
Senate, his civil rights perspectives varied to meet the needs of the 
prevailing political winds.77 Bush opposed the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act because it "was passed to protect 14 percent of the people. 
I'm also worried about the other 86 percent." He likewise opposed 
open housing legislation in 1966, saying that there were "[already] 
wonderful alternatives in the field of housing . . . . "78 Bush, how-
ever, vigorously supported fair housing legislation in 1968 and 
affirmative action in federal contracting in 1970.79 The explana-
tion for these inconsistencies--in a statement attributed to 
Bush-was that "I needed to get elected. "80 Jefferson Morley put 
a kinder-but nonetheless devastating-spin on Bush's civil rights 
record, namely, "George Bush isn't merely caught in the middle 
of this conflict [between Republican moderates and conserva-
tives]-he embodies it. JJSI 
The Bush presidency clearly reveals that the past is prologue. 
Rather than stand for something (even rhetorically if not in fact), 
Bush sought to conciliate civil rights interests without alienating 
conservatives. This mish mash approach to policymaking, although 
intended to be risk adverse, ultimately proved disastrous. By the 
end of his presidency, neither civil rights groups nor conservatives 
shed tears at Bush's electoral defeat. Unlike Clarence Thomas, 
who consistently advocated individual--centered approaches 
and-while dodging policy initiatives he deemed politically coun-
'76 See Marcus, supra note 13, at AI. 
'1'1 See Jefferson Morley, Bush and the Bku:ks: An Unlmuum SWry, N.Y. REv. BooKS, Jan. 
16, 1992, at 19-26. 
'78 Marcus, supra note 13, at A20. 
'79 See id.; Morley, supra note '1'1, at 24-25. 
80 Marcus, supra note 13, at A20. 
81 Morley, supra note '1'1, at 26. 
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ter-productive-put his advocacy into action, Bush's civil rights 
strategy was inherently discordant and therefore carried little favor 
with any constituency. · 
Bush's willingness to break faith with his predecessor is most 
vividly reveal~d in his handling of the Civil Rights Commission 
and the FCC, two entities that were immersed in Reagan-era con-
troversy. At the Civil Rights Commission, Bush appointees and key 
agency personnel disavowed the Reagan Commission's assertion 
that affirmative action "merely constit;utes another form of unjusti-
fied discrimination . . . [and] offends the Constitutional principle 
of eqUal protection. "82 Bush's choice for .chairn:tan, Arthur Fletch-
er, a personal friend of the President who also was a long time 
proponent of race-conscious hiring, perceived that "specifying the 
number of person-hours to be worked by minorities and women" 
as "typical contracting practice" and not a "quota. "83 Another 
Bush appointee, Charles Pei Wang, supported efforts by Actor's 
Equity to prevent a white actor froin playing a Eurasian role in 
the Broadway production of "Miss Saigon. "84 In addition to these 
appointments, staffers hired by the Reagan administration were 
dismissed so that the new leadership could "select staff with whoni 
it has personal confidence to carry out its policy goals. "85 
These changes at the Commission were intended to demon-
strate to the civil rights community dramatic differences between 
the Bush and Reagan presidencies. Bush wanted to tilt the balance 
of the Commission back again, so that-in the words of presiden-
tial spokesman Marlin. Fitzwater--it "could be stronger and more 
forceful in representing the concerns of minorities" than its prede-
cessor.86 
Here, rather than avoid his predecessor's mistakes, Bush affir-
matively sought to distance himself from Reagan by returning the 
Commission to its past glory. At a White House ceremony honor-
ing the newly constituted commission, Bush-borrowing a phrase 
from Senator Kennedy-spoke approvingly of the agency's historic 
role as "an independent, bipartisan voice for justice. "87 By em-
82 U.S. COMM'N ON CML RIGHTS, TOWARD AN UNDERSTANDING OF Srorrs 54 (1985). 
83 Arthur A. Fletcher, Fur Civil Rights, It's Baclc to the Future, N.Y. nMEs, Aug. 19, 
1990, at D19. 
84 &e Press Release, U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, Aug. 10, 1990. 
85 Letter from Wilfreda Gonzalez, Staff Director of the Commission on Civil Rights, 
to Brian D. Miller, Deputy General Counsel (June 12, 1~90) (copy on file with author). 
86 James Gerstenzag, Bush Names Fletcher to Head Rights Patza. L.A. nMEs, Feb. 24, 
1990, at A18. 
87 Remarks at a Meeting With the Comm'n on Civil Rights, I PuB. PAPERS 675 (May 
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bracing this characterization, Mr. Bush proved willing to shoot 
arrows at his predecessor. Ironically, when the President sought to 
moderate the Civil Rights Act of 1990, Commission Chairman 
Fletcher expressed "outrage" and questioned Bush's sincer[ity] 
about civil rights."88 
Bush's desire to work with civil rights interests is also revealed 
in his management of the Office of Federal Contract Compliance 
Programs ("OFCCP"), the govemmental office which supeiVises 
Executive Order 11,246 compliance. Reagan took heat both for his 
management of this office and his willingness to reconsider the 
11,246 program. Bush appointees, in contrast, were more active in 
enforcing 11,246. In fiscal year 1990, for example, 4,595 contrac-
tors were found to be in violation of OFCCP regula-
tions-prompting 2,855 "conciliation agreements" and 1,700 firms· 
committing to abide by OFCCP requirements.89 
Changes at the FCC were less dramatic but equally telling. 
Bush appointed three FCC Commissioners-Alfred Sikes, Sherrie 
Marshall, and Andrew Barrett-in the summer of 1989. All three 
expressly supported the race preference program repudiated by 
their predecessors in their confirmation hearings. 90 Before the 
Supreme Court, these appointees turned their words into deeds by 
vigorously (and successfully) defending diversity preferences in 
Metro Broadcasting v. FCC. 91 
Unlike Civil Rights Commission appointments, it is unlikely 
that Bush officials selected the FCC Commissioner in order to re-
verse Reagan-era approaches to civil rights. For the Bush adminis-
tration, telecommunications policy hinged on the re-establishment 
of a dialogue between the FCC and Congress. Bush sought to 
soothe strained relations in many ways, including his sacrificing of 
ideological consistency on affirmative action. 
The Metro Broadcasting litigation is telling for another reason. 
Before the Supreme Court, Bush appointees in the Justice Depart-
ment took issue with the FCC position. Characterizing these pref-
erences as "racial stereotyping that is anathema to basic constitu-
1'7, 1990) [hereinafter Remams]. 
88 Ann Devroy & Michael Isikoff, Administration Renews Threat to Veto Civil !Ughts Bill 
if Left Unchangttl, WASH. Posr, Oct. 13, 1990, at All. 
89 See Finn, supra note 15, at 21. 
90 See NominatWns:/uly: Hearings Befort! the Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transpar-
lation, U.S. Senate, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 341 (1989) (statement of Alfred C. Sikes); id. 
at 365 (statement of Andrew Barrett); id. at 380 (statement of Sherrie Marshall). 
91 497 U.S. 54'7 (1990); see Devins, supra note 62. 
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~onal principles, tl92 Solicitor General Kenneth Starr urged the 
Court to invalidate the FCC program. 
The spectacle of Bush appointees squaring off before the 
Supreme Court on a matter as explosive as race preferences ap-
pears bizarre. It is not. FCC appointees needed to satisfy constitu-
encies within Congress. Justice Department o:fficiais were not be-
holden to that constituency; instead, the Bush Justice Department, 
although unwilling to lead the charge of a civil rights cou.nterrevo-
lution, maintained its allegiance to the individuals and arguments 
of its predecessor. In many respects, the DOJ was Bush's calling 
card to movement conservatives who figured so prominently in the 
Reagan Revolution. To turn his back on that constituency,_ by 
ordering the Solicitor General to back away from the Metro Broad-
casting case, was unthinkable. The Bush administration was far 
more comfortable allowing its appointees to engage in open battle 
before the Supreme Court. Rather than being schizophrenic, the 
conflicting Court argument of the DOJ and the FCC simply reveal 
Bush's desire to assuage opposing constituencies. 
Bush's laissez fare attitude towards the DOJ, however, had its 
limits. Although willing to let the Department argue against prefer-
ences in court, Bush nonetheless expressed concern over a too 
rigid application of this position. On minority set-asides, he · nar-
rowly int~rpreted the DOJ's Supreme Court victory in City of Rich-
mond v. ].A. Croson Co.93 and spoke of being "committed to affir-
mative action" and, with it, his desire "to see a reinvigorated Of-
fice of Minority Business in Commerce. J794 Bush also demonstrat-
ed his support for mainstream civil rights interests by signing an 
executive order on historically black colleges and universities,95 a 
cause the President supported since he led the campus drive for 
the United Negro College Fund as a college student in 1948.96 
This longstanding support was demonstrated in other ways. When 
the Solicitor General filed a brief opposing increased financial 
support to black colleges, because such aid may perpetuate segre-
92 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 49'7 
U.S. 547 {1990) {No. 89453). 
93 488 u.s. 469 {1989). 
94 The President's News Conference, 1 PUB. PAPERS 21, 29 (Jan. 27, 1989}; SM also 
Sharon LaFraniere, On Civil Rights, Bush Aides Let Const:rvative Crusade Fade, WASH. Posr, 
Mar. 18, 1991, at AI. 
95 Exec. Order No. 12,6'77, 54 Fed. Reg. 18,869 {1989}, reprinUd in 20 U.S.C. 1060 
(Supp. ill 1991). 
96 8« Morley, supra note '7'7. 
. 
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gation by encouraging minority enrollment, Bush directed a rever-
sal of that position before the Supreme Court. 97 The triggering 
event here was a meeting in which black college presidents for-
mally complained to the President about the Solicitor General's 
brief.98 
Recognition of constituency interests figured prominently in 
Bush's dealings with the DO], the FCC, and the Civil Rights Com-
mission. These episodes are simply the tip of the iceberg. Interest 
balancing also explains Bush's treatment of several other civil 
rights issues. Witness Bush's strong backing of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act-legislation which both makes use of disparate 
impact proofs of discrimination (rooted in numerical imbalance) 
and requires state and private employers of fifteen or more to 
make "reasonable accommodations" necessary to employ otherwise 
qualified people with disabilities.99 In supporting this legislation, 
Bush distanced himself from Reagan by endorsing a major civil 
rights initiative, offended no one, and won favor with an extraordi-
narily powerful constituency of over forty-three million disabled 
Americans. Bush has also appealed to this constituency through 
his appointments to the EEOC, the agency principally responsible 
for writing the implementing regulations for and enforcing the 
provisions of this law. Bush's choice for chairman of the EEOC, 
Evan Kemp, as well as its chief of staff, Robert Funk, both came 
to the agency from disability rights interests groups.100 
Bush's embrace of "reasonable accommodation" demands is 
telling.101 Although some employers might feel pressure to hire 
the disabled simply to avoid litigation and other expenses, Bush 
spoke of "equality, independence, and freedom" when he signed 
the Disabilities Act. 102 This message, which is hard to square with 
97 See Linda Greenhouse, Bush Reverses U.S. Stance Against Black Cofkge Aid, N.Y. 
TIMEs, Oct. 22, 1991, at B6. 
98 See id. 
99 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (cod-
ified in scattered sections of titles 29, 42, 47 of the U.S.C.). 
100 See EEOC Chainnan./)esignate Evan Kemp WUl Bring New Perspective to Civil IUghls 
A~, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 34, at A-4 (Feb. 20, 1990). 
101 Unlike Title VII, where statistical based disparate impact proofs are of extraor-
dinary import, ADA plaintiffs might well make limited use of statistical proofs. As EEOC 
Chairman Evan Kemp put it: "[A] typical ADA case will involve the question of whether 
an individual's disability (which is often relevant) actually prevents him from doing the 
job.,. EEOC Chairman Criticius Danfm1h Proposal to Linlc l..Angua~ of Civil IUghls, ADA Act, 
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 185, at A-12 (Sept. 24, 1991). 
102 Ann Devroy, In Emot.Um-Filled Ceremony, Bush Signs IUghls Law fur America~ Disabled, 
WASH. POST, July 27, 1990, at AlB. 
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Bush's subsequent attacks on the 1990 and 1991 Civil Rights Acts_, 
dramatizes the White House's lack of coherence and coq.trol in 
civil rights decision making. Rather than advance a unified vision 
through its appointments or take steps to coordinate policy decla-
rations in the White House, White House direction typically took 
the form of identifying which constituency to seiVe. Beyond that, 
enforcement agencies t~nded to operate as mini-feifdoms, behold-
en to no one in the executive branch. The justice Department 
and the FCC's battle over race preferences or the DOJ's attack on 
historically black colleges in the face of a conflicting executive or-
der fits this pattern. , 
Bush's ~pproach to civil rights, like Hippocrates, was "do no 
harm." By placing the business of civil rights enforcement in the 
hands of individuals either a part of (Evan Kemp, Arthur Fletcher) 
or not opposed to (FCC appointees, Civil Rights Division head 
John Dunne) civil rights interests, Bush sought to separate himself 
from the costly controversies that engulfed his predecessor. More- , 
over, in the event of controversy, Bush typically favored the civil 
rights co.mmunity over his own appointees. His inteiVention on 
behalf of historically black colleges fits this model. A more striking 
example of Bush's abandonment of his appointees in favor of 
special interests involved Department of Education opposition to 
race-designated scholarships. 
On December 4, 1990, Michael Williams, the Department of 
Education's Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, concluded that laws 
prohibiting "discrimination on the grounds of race, color, or na-
tional origin" extend to race exclusive S!=holarships.103 This ruling 
disrupted Education's long--standing prac~ce of authorizing minori-
ty scholarships. In the aftermath of this unexpected announce-
' ment, an avalanche of protests from higher education and civil 
rights groups flooded both the White I;Iouse and the Education 
Department. 104 1 
Bush's handling of the minority scholarship flap is a prime 
example of minimizing political loss. I The reasonableness of 
Williams' interpretation was irrelevant. Tije prospect of the Depart-
ment of Education disrupting a longstaDding policy of better en-
103 &e Letter from Michael L. Wllliams, Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, to john 
junker, Fiesta Bowl Executive Director (Dec. 4, 1990); U.S. Dep'L of Educ. Press Release, 
Dec. 4, 1990. 
104 For descriptions of this episode, see EAsru\ND, supra note 2, at 284-87; Fmn, 
supra note 15, at 19-20. 
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abling disadvantaged minority youth to attend college offered no 
political advantage. 
White House sources immediately informed reporters that 
Education acted unilaterally and that the President disagreed with 
Williams' interpretation. Within a few days of its minority scholar-
ship an:Qouncement, the White House minimized potential damage 
by forcing Education to adopt a pizarre compromise of disallowing 
(after a four year transition period) federal race-specific support 
while authorizing all other race-specific designations.105 While 
recognizing that race-specific scholarships may run. contrary to the 
statutory prohibition against recipients of federal financial assis-
tance discriminating "in any program or activity," the President 
trivialized this concem as a matter for the "courts to rule on," "for 
now . . • we can continue to have these kinds of scholarships. "106 
Lamar Alexander, then Secretary of Education designate, went one 
step further.l07 At his confirmation hearings, he vowed to tempo-
rarily suspend restrictions on race-based scholarships and ex-
pressed regret that the Department of Education had "sent out 
exactly the wrong signal .... [to] minorities. "108 
The · Bush administration's discounting of subordinate legal 
interpretations on the minority scholarship question stands in 
sharp contrast to Reagan administration practices. Ronald Reagan 
created a firestorm of adverse publicity by defending controversial 
DOJ interpretations. Bush, unwilling to be saddled with the bur-
dens that befell his predecessor, quickly distanced himself from his 
subordinates. 
White House intervention here arguably is more than a politi-
cally expedient policy reversal. Mter all, as his intervention on be-
half of historically black colleges suggests, Bush may well have 
long been committed to enhancing educational opportunities for 
minority students through race-exclusive measures. In other words, 
Bush may simply have advanced his own understanding of appro-
priate govemmental policy in choosing to respond to civil rights 
constituencies rather than defend the legal interpretations of his 
appointees. Admittedly, like his support of minority set-asides, 
these outreach efforts do not jibe with Bush's charge that dispa-
rate impact proofs of discrimination improperly encourage race-
105 See U.S. Dep'L of Educ. Press Release, Dec. 18, 1990. 
106 Karen De Witt. U.S. Eases College Aid Stand, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 19, 1990, at AI. 
107 Kenneth J. Cooper, Review of Ra~Based Sclwlarships Promised, WASH. PoST, Feb. '1, 
1991, at A3. 
108 /d. 
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conscious hiring. Something else-aside from inconsistencies in 
the President's civil rights vision-is at play, however. Bush never 
sought to centralize policymaking on this question in the -White 
House. The . Williams interpretation went foxward because there 
were no established procedures for clearing alterations in execu-
tive policy through the White House. Bush, moreover, failed to 
maintain strong Secretary level control at Education. Rather than 
quickly replace Education Secretary Lauro Cavazos, a Reagan ap-
pointee described as . "hapless" and "notoriously weak, "109 Bush 
facilitated the circumstances in which an undersecretary could 
define executive branch policymaking. 
The final resolution of this dispute further reveals Bush's 
penchant to leave civil rights policymaking in the hands of ap-
pointees. Rather than keep the minority scholarship issue on ice 
(as Bush's endorsement of "these kinds of scholarships" could 
suggest); E~ucation proposed regulations in December 1991, speci-
fying that "[a] college may consider race as one factor among 
several when awarding scholarships. "110 Under intense pressure 
from Congress, Education again suspended rulemaking on this 
issue.U1 With Clinton's choice for Education Secretary, Richard 
Riley, describing minority scholarships as "vaaid, good and legal," 
this contentious issue-barring court action-appears put to rest 
through a return to the status quo ante~ 112 
The minority scholarship flap reinforces how difficult it is to 
affect policymaking through confrontational strategies. The Bush 
administration understood this, correctly gleaning from the Rea-
gan experience the pitfalls of an overly ideological, overly con-
frontational approach to civil rights. Bush's quick withdrawal from 
the Williams' interpretation, while prompting a conservative back-
lash, was understandable and appropriate. In the words of Educa-
tion Secretary Alexander: "I heard once that it's not a good idea 
to turn over every rock that you can, and this might have been a 
rock that it was best not to turn over. "115 Consequently, while 
laws prohibiting discrimination by recipients of federal largesse 
109 Fmn, supra note 15, at 19; EAs'rlAND, supra note 2, at 285. 
110 Nondiscrimination in Federally Assisted Programs, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,548 (1990) 
(proposed Dec. 10, 1991). These standards track the Supreme Court's decision in Re-
gents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
111 See Judges Allow &~Based Sclu:ikznhips, WASH. PoST, Feb. 6, 1993, at A3. 
112 ]d. 
113 Alexander, Martin Face Clear Sailing for Cabinet Posts, ATLANTA J. &: CONST., Feb. 7, 
1991, at A2. · 
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may well forbid race exclusive scholarships, that interpretation is 
better left to the courts than to an agency. There is a second 
reason to prefer judicial over agency action. Where Congress can 
make life miserable for an agency through its oversight powers as 
well as its control over an agency's purse strings, Congress' only 
response to judicial action is the difficult task of enacting new 
legislation. 
. The Bush White House learned little more from the Reagan 
administration than to eschew confrontational repudiations of 
long-standing policies. Bush too eschewed the advancement of an 
individual-centered civil rights agenda through the bureaucratic 
techniques championed by the EEOC. Bush, instead, advanced an 
agenda of issue avoidance. Political appointees were not a group 
of like-minded individuals seeking to advance some shared vision 
of the public good. For the most part, appointees reflected the 
interests of the affected constituency. 
This appointments strategy, needless to say, made for an inco-
herent civil rights agenda. Bush apparently did not care. Like 
Richard Nixon-who simultaneously sought to woo conservatives 
through his opposition to school desegregation and to appease the 
civil rights community through his support of minority hiring 
preferences114-Bush sought to have it both ways. This brink-
manship, by not displeasing either constituency too much, was de-
signed to keep the President removed from the civil rights fires 
that so consumed both the Carter and Reagan administrations. 
Along these lines, the Bush White House left it to agency heads to 
run their programs. It intervened only when agency level decisions 
prompted an outcry from affected interests. Minority scholarships 
and historically black colleges are two such examples. 
Bush was unable to have it both ways, however. Standing for 
something did matter. Events culminating in the Civil Rights Act 
of 1991 saw liberals and conservatives alike distancing themselves 
from Bush. Ironically, while deserving opprobrium for discounting 
civil rights, Bush was energetic, involved, and somewhat effective 
in shaping this legislative debate. 
IV. THE 1991 CML RIGHTS ACT 
Presidents often play a leadership role in shaping th~ content 
of civil rights legislation. When the White House disagrees with 
114 See gmerally GRAHAM, supra note 34. 
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the Congress, for example, the formidable task of overriding a 
veto encourages compromise. Of course, as was the case with the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, the White House may simply serve 
as a cheerleader to congressional initiatives. The 1991 Civil Rights 
Act was quite another matter, however. From April 3, 1990, less 
than two months after the legislation was first introduced, to Octo-
ber 23, 1991, two days before the announcement of a compromise 
agreement, the Bush administration steadfastly claimed that it 
would veto this behemoth package of civil rights reforms. During 
this period, the President once successfully exercised his veto pow-
er and on at least two dozen occasions publicly discussed this 
matter. 
The principal disagreement between the administration and 
Congress concerned disparate impact proofs of di~crimination. 
Arguing that proofs of employment discrimination sensitive to 
numerical imbalance "create a very real risk . . . of quotas, "115 
the White House advocated inclusion of stringent evidentiary stan-
dards to dissuade hiring by numbers. Congress and civil rights 
leaders, in contrast, endorsed more liberal proofs of discrimina-
tion. An epic struggle was fought over this matter. The stakes were 
high and both sides fought tooth and nail for their position. 
When a compromise was worked out, however, Bush was widely 
accused of capitulating to congressional sponsors. Reflective of 
conseiVative sentiments, Douglas Kmiec claimed that "Bush 
flopped, flipped, and ultimately totally flopped over the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991. "116 From the civil rights community, William 
Coleman and Vernon Jordan described the compromise as "a flat 
out repudiation of the administration's longstanding position."117 
Indeed, the President's only defender was his controversial coun-
sel, C. Boyden Gray. "Contrary to a rapidly congealing press 
myth," Gray wrote, "the Democrats beat a total retreat on quo-
tas."us 
The truth, as best I can tell, lies somewhere in the middle. 
Both sides made concessions and took calculated ris~ regarding 
future judicial interpretations. That Bush wound up with egg on 
115 &t:lrgroUnd /nf0T1111JJion and Text of Administration~ Civil Rights Bill. Daily Lab. Rep. 
{BNA) No. 43, at F-1 {Mar. 5, 1991). 
116 KMIEc, supra note 1, at 167. 
117 Coleman &: Jordan, supra note 17, at A21. 
118 C. Boyden Gray, Civil Rights: We Won, Thej Capitulated, WASH. Posr, Nov. 14, 1991, 
at A23. 
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his face simply reflects the widely held (and well founded) belief 
that Bush did not believe his anti-quota rhetoric. Like the boy 
who cried "wolf" too often, Bush's claim of standing to principle 
occurred in a backdrop of political expediency. Amazingly, the 
one episode where Bush significantly shaped a civil rights dialogue 
by personally standing up to civil rights interests is widely heralded 
as Bush's greatest failure. For this reason, the Civil Rights Act of 
1991 shows the necessity for a President to stake out a position. 
The starting point here is Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio.119 
In Wards Cove, the Supreme Court dramatically altered the debate 
over disparate impact proofs of discrimination. Rather than de-
mand that employment practices be related to job performance, 
Wards Cove concluded that "the dispositive issue is whether a chal-
lenged practice serves, in a significant way, the legitimate employ-
ment goals of the employer. "120 Wards Cove also held that the 
burden of persuasion "remains with the · disparate-impact . plain-
tiff"121 and that the plaintiff-worker had to specifically identify 
the employment practice that was being challenged.122 It was 
Wards Cove and four other 1989 decisions that prompted congres-
sional leaders to push for a new civil rights bill.123 Wards Cove, 
however, raised the quota issue and became the principal sticking 
point in negotiations between the White House and the Congress. 
A. 1990: Setting and Unsetting the Stage 
On February 7, 1990, the Civil Rights Act of 1990 was intro-
duced by Edward Kennedy in the Senate and Gus Hawkins in the 
House.124 Also, on February 7, Attorney General Dick 
Thornburgh said in a written statement that Wards Cuue was "root-
ed in the Court's opposition to racial quotas, which we share."125 
119 490 u.s. 642 (1989). 
120 /d. at 659. 
121 Jd. 
122 Jd. at 657. 
123 The other 1989 decisions are Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 
(1989); Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, 490 U.S. 900 (1989); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 
'155 (1989); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). The 1991 Act also over-
turned Astoria Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 111 S. Ct. 2166 (1991); West 
VII'ginia Univ. Hasps. v. Casey, Ill S. Ct. 1318 (1991). 
124 See 136 CONG. R.Ec. SIOIB-21 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1990) (text of 5.2104 and accom-
panying remarks by Sen. Kennedy); 136 CoNG. R.Ec. H364 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1990) (in-
troduction of H.R. 4000 and accompanying remarks by Rep. Hawkins). 
125 Statement by Attorney General Dick Thornburgh (Feb. 7, 1990) (on file with au-
thor). 
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The Justice Department "urged the Court to reach the deci-
sion ... it did in [Wards Cove], we agree with [it], and will op-
pose any legislation that seeks to overturn [it]. "126 If Congress 
statutorily overturns Wards Cove, then "[employers] will make sure 
they have so many blacks, so many hispanics and be done with 
it . . . [they will think] that the only safe course is to have quo-
tas. H}27 
The administration did agree with congressional sponsors that 
civil rights reform was necessary. On February 22, through Repub-
lican Senator Orin Hatch, an administration-backed bill was intro-
duced.128 The administration's proposal sought to overturn only 
two of the Court cases targeted by Kennedy-Hawkins, leaving intact 
Wards Cove's treatment of disparate impact cases. Congressional 
sponsors did not seriously consider the White House alternative; 
instead, on April 4, the Senate Labor Committee concluded that 
an employer must demonstrate that employment practices which 
have a disparate impact are "essential to effective job perfor-
mance. "129 One day earlier, on April 3, Attorney General 
Thornburgh claimed that this standard places an impossible bur-
den on employers and raised the spectre of a presidential 
veto. ISO 
The President stood behind this claim. On May 17, in a Rose 
Garden Ceremony welcoming his Civil Rights Commission appoint-
ees, Bush spoke out against quotas as "wrong [because] they vio-
late the most basic principles of our civil rights tradition and the 
most basic principles of the promise of democracy." Although 
unwilling "to sign a bill whose unintended consequences are quo-
tas," Bush spoke of the need for civil rights legislation "to 
obliterate consideration of factors such as race, color, religion, sex, 
or national origin from employment decisions. "1s1 "I want to sign 
a civil rights bill," said Bush, "but I will not sign a quota bill. "182 
126 Joan Biskupic, A Bipartisan HiU Coalilion Unveils IUghJs Measu"' 48 CONG. Q. AI, 
MANAC 892 (1990) (quoting Deputy Attorney General Donald Ayer). 
12'1 Id. 
128 See 186 CONG. REc. 5149'1 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1990) (introduction of 5.2166). 
129 S. REP. No. ~15, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 {1990). 
180 Letter from Attorney General Dick Thornburgh to Senator Edward M. Kennedy, 
Chairman, Committe~ on Labor and Human Resources {April 8, 1990) {on file with 
author). , 
181 Remmis, supra note 8'1, at '179. 
182 ld. 
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The Rose Garden speech was a telling event. On one hand, 
Bush made clear his desire to work with the civil rights communi-
ty. That this speech coincided with an event designed to bt1dge 
the Reagan-era gap between the civil rights community and the 
White House bolstered Bush's conciliatory message. On the other 
hand, Bush's anti-quota rhetoric cued civil rights leaders of the 
need to compromise on the Wards Cove issue. 
Bush'·s firmness on the quota issue had its effect. On the day 
of his Rose Garden speech, Kennedy-Hawkins sponsors softened 
their demand that eptployment practices be "essential to effective 
job performance" with substitute language requiring employment 
practices to bear a "substantial and demonstrable relationship to 
effective job performance. "1ss Two months later, Kennedy-
Hawkins was again softened. A "significant relationship," rather 
than a "substantial and demonstrable relationship" would now 
suffice.134 Moreover, instead of allowing an employee to rest her 
disparate impact claim on a group of employment practices, spon-
sors acceded to a particularity requirement prohibiting such a 
general allegation whenever a court finds that identification of 
specific practices is reasonably possible through examination of the 
employer's records.1s5 Finally, the substitute added new language 
providing that "nothing in . . . this Act shall be construed to re-
quire an employer to adopt hiring or promotion quotas. "1s6 
These C<?ncessions did not settle the issue. Although the 
White House was now willing to negotiate the terms of the statuto-
ry overturning of Wards Cove, Bush continued to speak of his de-
sire to "sign the civil rights bill of 1990 and not a quota bill of 
1990. "1s7 The revamped Kennedy-Hawkins would not do as Bush 
renewed his veto threat of this language. Instead, the White House 
endorsed a substitute measure requiring employment practices to 
bear a "manifest relationship" to the employment in question and 
that the employee has the burden of identifYing specific employ-
ment practices which contributed to the disparate impact.1s8 
133 See H.R. REP. No. 644, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pL 1, at 97 (1990); Joan Biskupic, 
Bwh Shifts on J~!Ughls Bill But Differmces Remain, 48 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 1563 (1990). 
1M See 136 CONG. REc. 59325-27 (daily ed. July 10, 1990) (text of Kennedy-Jeffords 
substitute). 
135 ld. at 59325. 
136 ld. 
137 EAsn.AND, supra note 2, at 341 n.4 ijuly 1990 remarks to National Council of La 
Raza). 
138 For the text of the Michei-LaFonlce substitute, see 136 CONG. REc. H6746-47 
(daily ed. Aug. 3, 1990). For the President's letter supporting this measure, see id. at 
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Negotiations among administration officials, the civil rights 
community, and congressional sponsors of the bill, which took 
place over several weeks during the summer, were unable to over-
come this impasse. Although negotiations nearly succeeded, the 
resolution of the Wards Cove issue ultimately proved impossi-
ble.159 The key here was not President Bush's principled objec-
tion to either numerical measures of discrimination or quotas. The 
President's civil rights record was already mired in inconsistency 
on these very matters. 
Like other civil rights matters, the President's practice was to 
delegate to his appointees and-if necessary-engage in damage 
control. The President then stood firm because his negotiating· 
team included his counsel C. Boyden Gray and Department of 
Justice officials who strongly backed Wards Cove. The only member 
on the administration team without a strong interest in the preser-
vation of Wards ·Cove was Chief of Staff John Sunnunu. Had 
Sunnunu controlled the negotiations a deal may well have been 
struck. According to one account, within hours of Kennedy and 
Sunnunu agreeing to a compromise, C. Boyden Gray submitted a 
conflicting offer.14n Another account, however, suggests that Ken-
nedy backed away from his agreement with Sunnunu after being 
pressured by civil rights interests.141 Irrespective of which of 
these accounts is accurate, it is nevertheless true that although the 
President's desire to work things out with civil rights interests had 
placed Wards Cove squarely on the bargaining block, the White 
House team proved stingy in their negotiations. 
On September 25, House and Senate conferees agreed to file 
a conference report quite close to the softened Kennedy-
Hawkins.142 Attorney General Thornburgh, in a letter dated Oc-
tober 12, indicated that the President "will be compelled to veto" 
the bill.145 "As we have repeatedly pointed out," said 
Thornburgh, "the trouble with the bill is that it will inevitably 
result in quotas being adopted surreptitiously to avoid the cost 
H6747-48. 
139 See Joan Biskupic, Deal on Civil IUghts Measu~ Stymied by ;Quota' Issue. 48 CONG. Q. 
.AlMANAC 2225 (1990). 
140 See Joan Biskupic, Partisan Rancor Maris Vote on Civil Rights Measu"- 48 CONG. Q . 
.ALMANAc 2312 (1990). 
141 See id. 
142 H.R. REP. No. 755, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990). 
143 Letter from Attorney General Dick Thornburgh to .Senator Robert Dole, Minority 
Leader (OcL 12, 1990) (on file with auth?r). 
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and trouble of disparate impact lawsuits. "144 When the confer-
ence report was passed by the Senate on October 16, and the 
House on October 17, a presidential veto seemed certain. On 
October 14, however, ~resident Bush, following a phone conversa-
tion with Vemon Jordan, ordered his negotiating team to meet 
with Jordan and William Coleman on October 16.145 The Presi-
dent wanted to compromise. Sunnunu, who recently had been 
embarrassed by his mismanagement of the 1990 budget summit, 
was also determined to reach an accord.146 
The Coleman:Jordan meeting proved a "disaster," however. 
Gray and Thomburgh, apparently, would not give in.147 And why 
should they? The President had committed himself to vetoing a 
"quota bill" and the definition of whether the 1990 Act constituted 
a "quota bill" was in their hands. While the President may have 
preferred their concluding otherwise, Bush demanded only that 
the meeting take place. Bush's willingness to hold his position ·on 
Wards Cove was influenced by his having not only the votes in 
Congress to sustain the veto but also the pressure from Republi-
cans who voted against the bill in anticipation of a White House 
veto. Bush also wanted to keep faith with conservatives who both 
strongly opposed the bill and doubted his commitment to their 
agenda. Put simply: Bush felt he would be better positioned by 
vetoing a "quota bill" than by signing controversial civil rights 
legislation. 
On October 22, the President, as he had promised, vetoed 
the 1990 Civil Rights Act.148 On October 24, the Senate, by a 
vote of 34-66, sustained the veto.149 
In his veto message, Bush devoted the bulk of his justification 
to Wards Cove. Claiming that "the bill actually employs a maze of 
highly legalistic language to introduce the destructive force of 
quotas into our Nation's employment system" and that "[i]t is 
neither fair nor sensible to give the employers of our country a 
144 Id. 
145 See Andrew Rosenthal, Civil IUghts Bill Gives Look at White House split, N.Y. TIMEs, 
Oct. 22, 1990, at A15. 
146 According to one source: "If the President wants a civil rights bill pretty bad, 
then Sunnunu wants one real bad. If the President wants a civil rights bill real bad, then 
Sunnunu is willing to play in traffic to get one." Id. 
147 It is possible that Gray and Thornburgh were mistakenly under the impression 
that Coleman and jordan were prepared to accede to White House demands. 
148 Message to the Senate Returning Without Approval the Civil Rights Act of 1990, 
2 PuB. PAPERS 1437 (Oct. 22, 1990) [hereinafter Message to the Senate]. 
149 136 CONG. R.Ec:. 516,562..02, S16,589 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1990). 
1993] CML RIGHTS UNDER BUSH . 989 
difficult choice between using quotas and seeking a clarification of 
the law through costly and very risky litigation," Bush concluded 
that "equal opportunity is not advanced but thwarted. "150 
This high sounding rhetoric was quickly called into question. 
Legislation that Bush sent to Congress contemporaneously with his 
veto was surprisingly similar to the legislation he vetoed on the 
Wards Cove issue. With respect to employment practices that are 
defended as a measure of job performance, for example, both 
bills defined business necessity as practices which "bear a signifi-
cant relationship to successful job performance," placed the bur-
den of persuasion regarding business necessity on employers, and 
allowed employees to challenge a group of employment practices 
when they are unable to demonstrate that a particular employ-
ment practice causes disparate impact because "elements of a deci-
sion-making process are not capable of separation. "151 Inconsis-
tencies between the Bush veto message as well as an accompanying 
Attorney General analysis152 are so stark that it appears that one 
set of White House interests (Gray and Thornburgh) controlled 
the veto message and another set (possibly Sunnunu) the pro-
posed legislation. This, of course, is not to · say that there were ~o 
differences of substance between ihe two measures. Significant 
differences did exist on punitive damages, the right to a jury trial, 
and nonparty rights to challenge court-approved settlement agree-
ments.155 The administration's proposal, moreover, by extending 
its coverage to court-ordered remedies, affirmative action, and con-
ciliation agreements raised doubts about Executive Order 11,246 
as well as voluntary affirmative action programs that courts had 
found outside the bounds of Title Vll.154 These differences, 
while significant, do not explain how a veto message rooted in 
disparate impact proofs and quotas can be reconciled with similar 
language in the White House alternative. 
150 Message to the Senate, supra note 148, at 1438. 
151 ComfHm §§ 3 &: 4 of the Bush bill, discussed supra note 128 with §§ 3 &: 4 of 
1990 Act. supra note 124. The Bush bill, however, embraced a more lenient definition of 
business necessity ("significant relationship to a significant business practice") in the case 
of other employment practices. Su § 3 of the Bush bill, supra note 128. 
152 See Memorandwn from Dick Thornburgh, Attorney General to the President on 
the Civil Rights Act of 1990 (OcL 22, 1990). 
153 See Significant Differmces Remain Between Vetoed Civil lUghls Bill and White House Pnr 
posal, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 214, at Cl (Nov. 5. 1990). 
154 See id. 
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The notion that Bush held strong personal views about quotas 
in employment does not explain the 1990 Act veto. Indeed, within 
weeks of his veto, Bush spoke passionately of his belief for race-
based scholarships. Ironically, the Bush appointee responsible for 
the minority scholarship flap, Michael Williams, mistakenly under-
stood Bush's antiquota rhetoric as a White House signal to do 
away with race-based scholarships.155 At that time, however, Bush 
was probably more interested in mending fences with those civil 
rights interests who were disappointed by his veto. 
Bush's positioning on the 1990 Civil Rights Act-even if unin-
tentional-proved a political windfall. By labelling the civil rights 
bill a "quota bill," Bush maximized political advantage, standing 
tall in the face of minority group pressure while speaking of ex-
panding guarantees of equal opportunity and eliminating preju-
dice in the workplace.156 Indeed, the civil rights veto proved a 
political bonanza for the President.157 Party spokesman Charles 
Black depicted the quota issue as a "'very salient,'" "'galvanizing 
issue among core Republicans and conservative Democrats.'"158 
Furthermore, by making the enactment of civil rights legislation 
one of his 1991 domestic priorities, Bush sought both to take the 
moral high ground and to control the debate on this volatile 
issue. 
B. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 
No time was wasted in efforts to enact a civil rights bill in 
1991. On January 3, Representative Jack Brooks introduced H.R. 
1159 and thus commenced the saga of the 1991 Civil Rights Act. 
Like deja vu, the bill proceeded in a parallel universe to its 1990 
predecessor:-including legislative compromises, anti-quota rhetoric, 
veto threats, and marathon summer negotiations. History did not 
repeat itself, however. Late appearing and unforeseen changes in 
the political climate transformed gridlock into an eleventh hour 
agreement. Throughout this episode, including the decisive last 
minute negotiations, the Bush White House held firm on congres-
sional efforts to replace Wards Cove with an explicit statutory stan-
155 See Paul A. Gigot, One Man~ Mettle Proved by Mw:ldle in \WUte House. WALL ST. J., 
Dec. 21, 1990, at A10. 
156 Message to the Senate, supra note 148, at 1438. 
15'1 Fred Barnes, The ~lace Card, NEW REPUBUC, Dec. 17, 1990, at 10. 
158 /d. 
159 H.R. 1, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). 
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dard. Whether these presidential efforts ranked a significant legis-
lative compromise or a. resounding politiCal defeat is another mat-
ter. 
H.R. 1, on the disparate impact issue, lifted the standard used 
in the vetoed 1990 Act. Not surprisingly, the White House rejected 
this approach out of hand. In fact, the administration continued 
to claim that Wards Cove should not be overturned. Pointing to 
post Wards Cove cases, Assistant Attorney General John Dunne told 
Congress in February that these cases "demonstrate that legitimate 
disparate impact claims can still be brought and won. "160 Dunne 
also reminded Congress of Bush's successfull990 veto, noting that 
the administration '\vould not accept a bill that results in quotas 
or other unfair preferences. "161 
On March 12, the Bush administration introduced its own 
. . 
civil rights legislation. Gone were the compromises contained in 
the legislation transmitted with the President's veto proposal. Argu-
ing that proof of employment discrimination sensitive to numerical 
imbalance creates . a very real risk of quotas, the White House 
endorsed the inclusion of stringent evidentiary safeguards to dis-
courage hiring by numbers. The Bush bill, for example, forbade 
employers who use ability tests from adjusting test scores or using 
different cut-offs for members of different groups.162 Moreover, 
the bill imposed a strict specificity standard, demanding that an 
employee "demonstrates that a particular employment practice 
causes a disparate impact, "165 and allowed employers to escape 
liability by demonstrating "business necessity," so long as the al-
leged practice ad~ces "legitimate employment goals. "164 Only on 
the noncontroversial burden of proof issue, where the White 
House bill placed the burden on_ the employer, was the adminis-
tration willing to overrule Wards Cove.165 Bush's position here was 
a marked departure from his earlier willingness to allow excep-
tions to the "particular employment practice" demand and to 
160 Hearings on H.R. I, TM Civil !Ughl.s Ad of 1991, Before the House Comm. on Educa-
tion and Labor, 102d Cong., lst Sess. 545 (1991) (memorandum for the Attorney Gener-
, al). . ' 
161 Statemml of Assistant Attorney General John Dunne Before Hause Judiciary Subcomm. on 
Civil Rights on the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (H.R. 1), Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 2'7, at F-1 
(Feb. 8, 1991). 
162 H.R. 13'75, S. 611, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). 
163 Id. § 4(k) (emphasis added). 
164 Id. § 3(n) (emphasis added). 
165 5« supra note 151 and accompanying text. • 
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require employers to demonstrate that hiring practices are signifi-
cantly related to "successful job performance. "166 
The battle lines drawn between the President and Congress 
were hardly surprising. Congressional civil rights advocates ad-
vanced a bill that nearly overrode Bush's veto and hoped for the 
best. Bush, in contrast, was less willing to compromise. He and his 
spokesmen also turned up the familiar anti-quota rhetoric. Attor-
ney General Thornburgh said the administration bill would en-
courage employers to "provide equal opportunity for all workers 
without resorting to quotas or other unfair preferences. "167 Bush 
also echoed this familiar refrain. "I ·am not going to sign a bill 
that will foster quotas, directly or indirectly," said ;Bush, "the small 
employer [must not be driven] into a state of frenzy because of 
fearing mindless legislative action against him. "168 Bush had good 
reason to pound this theme; his veto had proven politically popu-
lar and there was reason to think it had taken some wind out of 
bill sponsors' sails. Bush's new found bravado, according to press 
accounts, was also revealed in his alleged pressuring of business 
leaders who sought a compromise on H.R 1 independent of the 
White House.169 This hardball tactic, as one observer put it, en-
sured that "if_ a bill is to pass [in 1991], it will only be through a 
deal with President Bush. "170 
H.R 1 sponsors recognized the power of the administration's 
rhetorical advances. Ralph Neas, director of the Leadership Con-
ference on Civil Rights and target of presidential rebuke, be-
moaned that "the overwhelming concern [in Congress] has been 
the quota issue, much more politically than substantively. "171 To 
shore up legislative support, and a realistic veto override threat, 
H.R. 1, in late May, was amended. The amendment limited some 
punitive damages awards; more significant, business necessity was 
166 See sujrra notes 1S2-33 and accompanying text. 
167 lWUte House Civil Rights Bill Would E:tpand Harassment Awanls, But Reject Jury optWn, 
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 4S, at A-4 (Mar. 5, 1991) (citing a letter Thornburgh sent to 
congressional leaders accompanying the administration's bill). 
168 Remarks to the National Retail Federation, I PUB. PAPERS 549, 551 (May 23, 
1991). 
169 Joan Biskupic, Job Discrimination Legislation Roils Business Community, 49 CONG. Q. 
ALMANAC 989 (1991). 
170 Joan Biskupic, Wtth Business Talks StaiJed, Bush Holds Best Hand. 49 CONG. Q. ~ 
MANAC 1063 (1991). 
171 Joan Biskupic, Democral.s Scramble for Cover Under GOP 'Q!ulta' Attadu, 49 CONG. Q. 
ALMANAc 1378 (1991) (quoting Ralph G. Neas, Director of the Leadership Conference 
on Civil Rights). 
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moderated to "a significant and manifest relationship to the re-
quirements of effective job performance" and the specificity re-
quirement was reinstated unless a court concludes that, "after 
diligent effort," the specific practices cannot be isolated from tlie 
group.172 The amended bill, finally retained language specifying 
that the amendments should not be construed "to require, encour-
't tas "17S age, or permt . . . quo . 
The White House flatly rejected the amended H.R. 1. 
Thornburgh depicted the bill as "a ho~" and said it "excludes 
from the definition of quotas the only kind of quotas . . . already 
in existence."174 "Nothing has changed," warned the Attorney 
General, "[t]he president will veto any legislation which has under-
gone only cosmetic changes ·and which still forces quotas. "175 
President Bush likewise attacked the bill as the "road to lawsuits 
and discord," for "[e]ven the section that supposedly outlaws quo-
tas endorses quotas."176 "[I]t's a quota bill, regardless of how its 
authors dress it up. You can't put a sign on a pig and say it's a 
horse. "177 Lamenting his inability to compromise and the short 
shrift given his alternative (which would "encourage people to 
work together, rather than employing quotas"), Bush criticized 
"[t]he beltway interest groups and their spokespersons [for want-
ing] to make me accept or veto a quota bill. "178 
On June 5, the amended H.R. 1 passed the House by a vote 
of 273-158, a slightly narrower margin than the 1990 Act and 
fifteen short of a veto proof majority.179 Noting that "the num-
ber of votes in opposition . . . indicates strong support for sustain-
ing a Presidential veto," the White House, not H.R. 1 sponsors, 
claimed "grati [tude]" and victory by the House vote.180 
172 H.R. 1, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ lOl(o)(l), 102(k)(b), 106 (1991) (as amended 
on June 5, 1991). 
178 Id. § 111. 
174 Thrte Vmion.s of Civil lUghls &form WiU Be ConsU:lertd By House Next Week, Daily Lab. 
Rep. (BNA) No. 105, at A-5 (May 81, 1991). 
175 Id. 
176 Remarks at the Federal Bureau of Investigation Academy Commencement in 
Quantico, Vuginia, 1 PUB. PAPERS 581, 588 (May SO, .1991). 
177 Remarks at the United States Military Academy Commencement Ceremony in 
West Point, New York, 1 PuB. PAPERS 589, 591-92 (June 1, 1991). 
178 Remarks to the National Federation of Independent Business, 1 PUB. PAPERS 596, 
598 (June 8, 1991). 
179 Legislative Profile Report (102d Congress) (Lexis, Legis Library, Cngvot file). 
180 See Statement by Press Secretary Fitzwater on Civil Rights Legislation, 1 PUB. PA~ 
PERS 618, 618 (June 5, 1991). 
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Enter John Danforth, a Republi~ Senator from Missouri. 
Danforth introduced compromise legislation in June which went 
over like a lead balloon with the administration. By defining busi-
ness necessity as "a manifest relationship to the requirements for 
effective job performance, "181 EEOC chairman Kemp informed 
Chief of Staff Sunnunu that employers would "have little choice 
but to revert to [quotas]"182 and Attorney General Thornburgh 
chided Danforth for demanding more than the "established" legal 
·standard of "manifest .relationship to the employment in ques-
tion. "188 In September, Danforth tried again. This time borrow-
ing language from the Bush-supported Americans with Disabilities 
Act. 184 The White House, although somewhat receptive to bor-
rowing from the ADA, rejected this effort. 185 Press Secretary Mar-
lin Fitzwater depicted Danforth's latest compromise as an invita-
tion to quotas and the OMB issued a statement of administration 
policy savaging the bill as a "quota bill" and noting that the 
President's "senior advisers would recommend a veto. "186 The 
use of the Disabilities Act language was considered irrelevant, both 
because that law treats "'business necessity' as an undefined term" 
and because the Danforth compromise limits nonparty rights to 
challenge "quotas" contained in extant content decrees.187 
At summer's end, the prospects for compromise seemed 
bleak. Bush, buoyed by the House vote, held to his position. In a 
series of speeches, moreover, Bush also made clear that it was the 
"lawyers" in his administration-Dick Thornburgh and C. Boyden 
Gray-who were defining administration policy on the 1991 Act. 
In explaining his objections to the amended H.R 1, Bush-who 
had earlier and proudly declared his ignorance on legal mat-
ters-emphasized that "[a]s· far as our experts can tell ... the 
changes that they're proposing are strictly cosmetic. "188 When 
181 S. 1208, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). 
182 Administration Officials Target Moderate RepuhlictJn Civil Rights Bill. Daily Lab. Rep. 
(BNA) No. 124, at A-15 Qun. 27, 1991). 
183 Texl of Letter from Attonuy GeMrol Thomburgh w Sm. Danfarlh, jun. 21, 1991, Daily 
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 124, at E-1 Qun. 27, 1991). 
184 EEOC Clwinnan Crilicius Danforth Proposal w Link lAngua~ of Civil Rights, ADA Act, 
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 185, at A-12 (Sep. 24, 1991) (draft version of S. 1'145). 
185 The administration viewed their own proposal as the only framework within which 
to incorporate the ADA language. See White HOUS4 Tmdes Chargu with Danforth; Con.snv~­
tives Tinker with Administration Bill. Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 18'1, at A-6 (Sept. 26, 
1991). 
186 Statement of Administration Policj on S. 1745 Oclober 23, 1991, Daily Lab. Rep. 
(BNA) No. 206, at F-1 (Oct. 24, 1991). 
18'1 ld. 
188 Remarks to the National Retail Federation, 1 PUB. PAPERS 549, 551 (May' 23, 
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Danforth introduced compromise legislation a few weeks later, the 
President remarked in an exchange with reporters that "[o]ur 
attorneys and the A:ttorney General are looking at it. "189 Corre-
spondingly, when he opposed the original Danforth compromise, 
Bush remarked "don't inflict the American people with something 
that inevitably, in the opinion of the Attorney General, our own 
counsel ... lead[s] to quotas."190 Finally, in explaining his views 
on a further modified Danforth compromise, Bush simply referred 
to "the Attorney General's opinions."191 With Thornburgh and 
Gray having led the veto charge in 1990, the prospects of another 
presidential veto loomed as la~e as October 23, the date of the 
OMB statement. 
The very next day, however, "marathon negotiations" resulted 
in a compromise that the President proclaimed he would "enthusi-
astically sign. "192 "It does not resort to quotas, and it strengthens 
the cause of equality in the workplace," said Bush.198 The key to 
the compromise was the bill's failure to conclusively define busi-
ness necessity. Inste.ad, by reference to an interpretive memo, the 
1991 Act said that judicial interpretation of "business necessity" 
should be governed by the "concepts enunciated by . . . Supreme 
Court . . . decisions prior to Wards Cove Packing Co. v. 
Atonio. "194 The compromise also included concessions from both 
sides on specificity and damage awards as well as broad conces-
sions from bill sponsors on attorney fees and from the White 
House on nonparty challenges to consent decrees, punitive damag-
es, and the availability of jury trials. 195 
1991). 
189 Exchange with Reporters Aboard Air Force One, I PUB. PAPERS 657, 657 (June 
14, I991). 
I90 Exchange with Reporters, I PUB. PAPERS 694, 695 (June I9, I99I). 
191 The President's News Conference, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1013, 1017 (Aug. 2, 1991). 
192 The President's News Conference, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1328, 1328 (Oct. 25, 1991). 
193 Id. 
194 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (1991), 
referring to 137 CoNG. REc. S 15276 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991) (interpretive memorandum 
as introduced by Sen. Danforth) (citation omitted). 
195 On the issue of damage awards, the Act allows victims of intentional dis-
crimination to recover compensatory and punitive damages in addition to relief already 
available under existing legislation. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 
I05 Stat. 10'11, 1072 (1991). In addition, the Act limits damage awards, although not to 
the levels the Bush Administration sought. Id. On the issue of specificity, the Act requires 
a complainant to demonstrate the specific practice or practices that caused the disparate 
impact. The Act does provide an exception if the worker "can d,emonstrate to the court 
that the elements of a [company's] decisionmaking process are not capable of separation 
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Why did the White House team, after nearly two years of 
steadfast opposition to a compromise civil rights measure, agree to 
this arrangement? One account sees Bush as politically expedient, 
someone who never cared about the quota issue and, consequent-
ly, quite willing to shift his stance once it appeared his hard line 
position was politically unpopular. This recounting places great 
weight on two October 1991 events that may well have changed 
popular perceptions of a second Bush veto.196 On October 11-13, 
Anita Hill's allegations of sexual harassment against Supreme 
Court nominee Clarence Thomas played out before the nation. 
On October 19, former Ku Klux Klansman and reborn Republican 
David Duke became one of two candidates who would participate 
in a November run-off election for governor of Louisiana. The 
emergence of the Hill-Thomas and Duke controversies clearly 
raised the symbolic stakes of a Bush veto. Given Bush's erratic 
track record on civil rights and his apparent desire to place politi-
cal popularity ahead of a principled vision, it is not inappropriate 
to conclude that the October 24 compromise was a political capit-
ulation. Under this view, compromises made by bill sponsors were 
an unimportant bone tossed the President's way so that he could 
try to save some face. 
A more charitable interpretation of the October 24 compro-
mise was that the Bush team was politically pragmatic. The Hill-
Thomas and Duke episodes ~ected not only popular opinion but 
congressional votes. On October 23, two Republican Senators that 
Bush counted on to sustain his veto, John Wamer of Virginia and 
Ted Stevens of Alaska, informed the President that they might not 
support him in a veto override fight. 197 With fears of his coali-
tion collapsing, Bush was compelled to strike a deal with bill sup-
porters. 
The truth probably lies somewhere in the middle. The Octo-
ber 23 OMB memo suggests that-even after Hill-Thomas and 
Duke-there was some fight in the administration. That is not to 
say that the President-whose earlier efforts at compromise with 
William Coleman and Vernon Jordan suggest-did not want to 
for analysis." Id. § 105, 105 Stat. at 1074. Contrary to Bush proposals, the Act both allows 
for jury trials and limits nonparty rights. ld. §§ 102(c), 108, 105 Stat. at 1076. 
196 Pamela Fessler, Rights Bill Rises From the Ashes of Senate's Tlwmas Fight, 49 CONG. Q. 
ALMANAC 8093, 3124 (1991). 
197 Id. On the relationship between White House-Congress negotiations and the pros-
pects of a veto override, see William N. Eskridge Jr., Rmeging on Historf1 Playing the 
Court/Congress/President Civil RighJs Game, 79 CAL. L. REv. 613 (1991). 
1993) CML RIGHTS UNDER BUSH 997 
reach an accord with the civil rights community and sign reform 
legislation. Indeed, on October 18 (after Hiii~Thomas but before 
Duke's October 19 second place finish in Louisiana's gubernatorial 
primary), Bush is reported to have "strongly expressed" to Gray 
and others his desire to sign a bill.198 With Duke's electoral suc-
cess and the comlll:uniques from Stevens and Warner, that strong 
expression was more likely to spur a legislative compromise. At the 
same time, the President was not willing to completely give in to 
the other side. He would not, for example, sign a bill that he had 
previously characterized as a quota bill. With Gray and 
Thornburgh on the President's negotiating team and with the veto 
override too close to call, bill sponsors needed to take into ac-
count the possible failure of compromise and ultimate defeat in 
an override battle. 
The stage was then set for successful negotiations. Although 
the bargaining power of the Bush team was severely c~mpromised, 
civil rights supporters were too vulnerable to disregard the threat 
of a presidential veto. The peculiar solution was the endorsement 
of language so devoid of meaning that both sides could claim 
victory. Supreme Court decisions pre-dating Wards Cove had alter-
natively embraced both the White House proposal ("manifest rela-
tionship to the employment in question") and the original H.R. 1 
("significantly related to job performance") .199 
What courts would do in the future was a calculated risk for 
both sides. The White House team hoped that a 1992 Bush victory 
would keep DOJ and EEOC interpretations in their corner as well 
as ensure a further strengthening of a judiciary principally con-
trolled by Reagan and Bush appointees. With some luck, the 
courts might weii settle on an interpretation of disparate impact 
proofs quite close to Wards Cove. Civil rights interests, needless to 
say, hoped that courts would take · a skeptical view of the 
President's post-hoc propaganda campaign and, instead, pay at-
tention to their own post-hoc propaganda campaign. 
Biii supporters, however, did not place much stock on the 
expectation that a Democrat would win the White House and 
advance an expansive view of disparate impact proofs through DOJ 
. . 
198 See Ann Devroy, Bush Saw Gains in Deal, OjftcWJs Say, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 1991, 
at AI. 
199 Both of these standards are contained in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 
(1971), the Supreme Court's leading disparate impact decision prior to Wards Cove. See 
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 426 ("significantly relatedj; id. at 432 ("manifest relationship"). 
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and EEOC litigation. Had civil rights interests perceived that Bush 
would lose the 1992 elections, it is unlikely that they would have 
compromised on disparate impact standards or attorney fees. In-
stead, they would have risked an unsuccessful veto override know-
ing that a Democratic President would likely back the original 
H.R. 1 package. In the fall of 1991, however, it was unreasonable 
to expect either the fall of Bush or the ascendancy of Clinton. 
On November 21, the President signed the Civil Rights Act of 
1991. While proudly proclaiming that his leadership resulted in a 
law that '\vill not lead to quotas, which are inconsistent with equal 
opportunity and merit-based hiring; nor does it create incentives 
for needless litigation, "200 the day was a bittersweet one for Bush. 
His anti-quota stance, in many respects, hinged on his assertion 
that Wards Cove was only overturned insofar as the new law shifted 
the burden of persuasion from employee to employer and that an 
interpretive memorandum prepared by Senate minority leader 
Robert Dole be treated as "authoritative interpretive guidance by 
all officials in the executive branch. "201 The Dole memo, howev-
er, was no more than a floor statement advancing one plausible 
interpretation of the statute. Bush's interpretation of the 
legislation's explicit overturning of Wards Cove, moreover, was at 
least highly speculative. 
The ceremony was bittersweet for other reasons. Several Dem-
ocratic sponsors of the law and civil right groups boycotted the 
signing ceremony in protest of a draft signing statement which 
called for the elimination of federal affirmative action programs 
"that may be inconsistent with the new law or with the principle 
of discouraging quotas and unfair preferences. "202 The President 
distanced himself from the proposed signing statement and pro-
claimed his support of affirmative action. 203 The signing state-
ment episode, however, once again demonstrated the President's 
lack of conviction and leadership. He was again left with egg on 
200 Statement on Signing the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 1 PUB. PAPERS 1504, 1504 
(Nov. 21, 1991). 
201 /d. at 1702 (referring to 137 CoNG. REc. S 15,472-78 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991)). 
Dole's memo asserted that "the bill is no longer designed to overrule the meaning of 
business necessity in Wanls Owe." /d. at S15,475. Bush also used his signing statement to 
direct federal agencies to treat the Act as having only prospective, not retroactive, force. 
S« Dispuk Over Retroactivity of Civil Rights Acl Stems ftrnn Legislative Histmy, Hill Staffer Says, 
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 14, at A-13 Qan. 22, 1992). 
202 Draft Signing Statement, reprinkd in AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, THE CML RIGHI'S 
Acr OF 1991 317 (1992). 
203 S« William Raspberry, Bush's Missing Drummer, WASH. PoST, Nov. 25, 1991, at A21. 
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his face as both civil rights and conservative interests defiled his 
lack of vision and courage. 
The 1991 Civil Rights Act is generally considered a policy 
debacle for the Bush White House. Aside from the signing state-
ment fiasco and the legislative proposal Bush sent Congress with 
his 1990 veto, however, administration policy was quite consistent 
and clearly effective. No doubt, the White House retreated quite a 
bit from its origin"al position. But so did congressional backers, 
especially when one considers the original K.enn.edy-Hawkins' pro-
posal. Had it not been for growing fears of a successful veto over-
ride, moreover, it is quite possible that Bush would have refused 
to agree to many of the concessions he made· and again vetoed 
the 1991 Act. · 
That no one describes Bush's conduct here as political prag-
matism is itself revealing. In the end, the President lost the battle 
over symbols and, given the vacuousness of his civil rights policy, 
symbols were all he had. That his hard line negotiators may have 
both kept his policy fairly consistent and secured something more 
than a pyrrhic victory did not matter. His last minute compromise 
seemed a complete capitulation because his anti-quota rhetoric was 
obviously self-contradictory and self-serving. On too many occasions 
the President had made the politically expedient choice, making it 
difficult to view his 1991 Act compromise as something other than 
a political sellout. 
V. CONCLUSION: THE PROSPECTS OF CONSTRUCTIVE 
COUNTER-ADVOCACY 
Twelve years of Republican rule accomplished very little in the 
disassembly of group-conscious goals and timetable as well as nu-
merical proofs of discrimination. If anything, the evolution of 
judicial doctrine, statutory language, and agency regulation has not 
dented group-conscious approaches. What explains this state of 
affairs? Are group-Conscious approaches so entrenched that White 
House opposition was doomed to failure? Alternatively, did Reagan 
and Bush secretly support group-conscious approaches so that the 
current state of affairs actually matches White House preferences? 
Both of these propositions are not without force. Reagan's eventu-
al support of the 1982 voting rights reforms as well as his refusal 
to rescind Executive Order 11,246 are in part explained by wide-
spread support for both measures. White House suppC?rt of 
preferences is evidenced by Bush's position on minority set-asides 
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and race-exclusive scholarships as well as his appointments to the 
FCC, Civil Rights Commission, and other government agencies. 
The current state of affairs is also-and I believe more funda-
mentally-explained by the political failures of the Reagan and 
Bush administrations. The Reagan White House impeded its own 
effectiveness by taking a too confrontational, too ideological stance 
on such issues as the private school tax-exemption controversy and 
the Civil Rights Commission. Reagan ~s ability to constructively 
participate on voting rights reform, revisions to Executive Order 
11,246, and the like were hampered by these initiatives. The Bush 
White House's failings were the flip-side of this coin. Rather than 
seeing-as one Bush White House official put it-the Reagan era 
as "a valiant effort not done right, the opposite lesson was taken, 
which was: ·Let's not engage on civil rights ... lees not stake out 
a principled view. "204 The consequence of the purposeful ab-
sence of leadership, not surprisingly, was a failed presidency (on 
civil rights at least). Bush simply did not understand that civil 
rights policymaking implicates fundamental moral concerns so that 
it is necessary for a President to have some position on questions 
of numerical proofs of discrimination as well as on race and gen-
der preferences. It cost the Bush administration dearly that it did 
not figure out "that the American public would welcome vigorous, 
principled leadership on this increasingly bitter front. "205 
What then should Presidents do? The Reagan EEOC, I think, 
provides an answer of sorts. Cl~ence Thomas, by understanding 
that having a civil rights vision does not mean acting on it at all 
times, accomplished a lot. Through resource prioritization, agency 
reorganization, and refusing to discover new vistas in the law, the 
Reagan EEOC adeptly advanced an individual~entered approach 
towards civil rights enforcement. Admittedly, by not directly chal-
lenging disfavored approaches, the EEOC kept on the books regu-
lations that it disliked. This approach, however, does not c9ncede 
complete incoherence in governmental decisionmaking nor does it 
evidence a refusal to lead by ducking politically costly approaches. 
Rather, the Reagan EEOC model offers the greatest likelihood of 
enduring presidential leadership. 
Let me explain. Clarence Thomas sought to re-shape the civil 
rights debate by advocating an individual-centered approach and 
putting. that advocacy into practice through new agency initia-
204 Marcus, supra note 13, at A20. 
205 Finn, supra note 15, at 23. 
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tives. 206 . Thomas also criticized the pre-existing group-conscious 
regime. 207 This dual advocacy offered the best opportunity for 
diminishing resistance to the dismantling of group-conscious ap-
proaches and replacing them with individual-centered programs 
that are alrea4y in place and are effective. This proposition, admit-
tedly, is difficult to prove. Yet, the clear failure of confrontational 
strategies suggests that-had Bush truly favored individual ap-
proaches-the Thomas model would have been a worthwhile gam-
bit. 
The lessons of the EEOC are not limited to conservative Presi-
dents seeking to swim against a prevailing liberal current. Bill 
Clinton too can make g9od use of the lessons of the past twelve 
years. These lessons, in no particular order, are: (1) Be careful in 
picking fights with Congress and its constituents; (2) Bureaucratic 
approaches such as resource prioritization and agency reorganiza-
tion may advance policy objectives without risking costly political 
battles; (3) Stand for something; and ( 4) Expect some inconsisten-
cies in the civil. rights approaches taken by the White House and 
governmental agencies. By viewing civil rights as the "art of the 
possible," a President can effectively affect government 
decisionmaking on this volatile issue. 
206 See sufrra note 41 and accompanying text. 
20'1 ~ sufrra note S5 and accompanying text. 
